



Module Name: Theories and Actors of the Policy Process

Module Code: PUBLG074

Teaching: 10 hours of lectures, 10 hours of seminars

Credits: 30

Assessment: Three Hour Examination

Essay Deadline/s: N/A

Lecturer: Margarita Gelepithis and Tim Hicks

Office Hours: TBC

**Please note that this is a core module for students registered on the MSc Public Policy programme and is not available as an optional module.*

USEFUL LINKS

Lecture and Seminar Times:

Online Timetable at www.ucl.ac.uk/timetable

Extenuating Circumstances

<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/intranet/pg/assessment/extenuating-circumstances>

Penalties for Late Submission and Overlength Essays

<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/intranet/pg/assessment/essays/#tabs-5>

Essay Submission Information

<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/intranet/pg/assessment/essays>

Examinations

<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/intranet/pg/assessment/examinations>

Plagiarism and TurnItIn

<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/intranet/pg/assessment/plagiarism-turnitin>

PUBLG074

Theories and Actors of the Policy Process

Dr Margarita Gelepithis	Office Hours: Thursdays, 14:30-16:30 E-mail: margarita.gelepithis@ucl.ac.uk
Dr Tim Hicks	Office Hours: Wednesdays, 10:30-12:30 E-mail: t.hicks@ucl.ac.uk

Aims and Objectives

The aim of the course is to further understanding of the different actors, processes and stages involved in formulating public policies in liberal democracies, using a range of analytical approaches. At the end of the course, students should have acquired a working knowledge of different theories of public policy—their methods, assumptions and limitations.

Aims

1. To provide a sound account of the logic and structure of the main analytical approaches to the making and evaluation of public policy.
2. To show how these approaches enable us to understand the role of key actors in the policy process.

Learning Outcomes

After taking the module, you should:

1. Be familiar with the main analytical approaches to the study of public policy.
2. Understand the underlying logic of each approach, and also understand how each theory can be applied to public policy processes.
3. Be familiar with the main criticisms applicable to each approach and be in a position to evaluate the validity of those criticisms.

Lectures and Seminars

Sessions will consist of the following:

1. A seminar, based on the previous week's reading. After a short question and answer session to review the week's topic, there will be a presentation by two to three of the students on the course raising interesting questions for discussion. In most weeks we will take a case study to illustrate the topic of the lecture and to provide a practical example of public policy decision-making. Seminar groups will be allocated during Induction Week. Topics will be allocated in the first seminar of the term. Students are required to read at least the core reading before a seminar—even if you are not presenting. It is much more likely that there will be a lively and useful discussion if everyone has familiarised themselves with the key arguments.
2. A lecture of one hour, on Tuesdays at 9am, which is aimed to introduce you to both the coming week's reading and a wider view of the literature. Note: therefore, the date for each session denotes the topic for lecture rather than the seminar, which will be a week later.

Most theories of the policy process are based on the UK, the USA and Western Europe, but they often apply to the rest of the world. Nonetheless, seminar participants are very much encouraged to introduce examples from other countries and places, including those they may be familiar with.

Seminar presentations should be accompanied by a Powerpoint or Beamer presentation and/or a handout. Students should make an appointment to discuss preparation for their seminar presentations with the relevant lecturer beforehand. If the student gives a 'dry run' of the presentation, the lecturer will be able to give feedback that can improve the final presentation.

Assessment: Examination and Essays

The course will be assessed by a three-hour examination in Term 3. A revision class will be held at the beginning of Term 3.

Students will be able to write a non-assessed practice essay question (using a question from a past examination questions available on Moodle) that may be handed in at the start of the second term in January.

Guidance

Students are always welcome to make an appointment to see Margarita Gelepithis or Tim Hicks about the course at a mutually convenient time or during office hours (see the Moodle page for booking online). Students will also be allocated personal tutors during the first three weeks of term.

Readings

A list of reading material is given for each session of the course below. Each week the lecture will include an introduction to the reading, indicating which items are most important for each sub-theme of the topic. Some items are marked with a '*' to indicate core reading for the week.

For those interested in various general perspectives on and treatments of policy-making, there are several texts that you may find to be of value:

- P. John (2012) *Analyzing Public Policy* 2nd edition (London: Routledge).
- G. Allison and P. Zelikow (1999), *Essence of Decision* (2nd edition) [first edition from 1971 is just as good]. This book has rightly been much discussed and it illustrates very well the interplay of analysis and empirical understanding.
- P. Sabatier (ed. 1999) *Theories of the Policy Process* (Westview Press)
- Peters, B.G. (2010), *The Politics of Bureaucracy: An Introduction to Comparative Public Administration* (London: Routledge)
- Parsons, W. (1995) *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar)

Lecture Plan

1. Introduction to Public Policy (MG/TH)
2. Collective Action and Interest Groups (MG)
3. Spatial Theories of Voters and Politicians (TH)
4. Institutional Approaches with Rational Actors (TH)
5. Bureaucrats and Delegation (TH)
6. READING WEEK
7. Bounded Rationality (TH)
8. Ideas and Sociological Institutionalism (MG)
9. Agenda Setting, Public Opinion and the Media (MG)
10. Implementation (MG)
11. Review and Synthesis (MG/TH)

Note: dates refer to lectures, seminars on the same topic follow the week after).

1. Introduction to Public Policy (MG/TH: 30 Sep)

Defining terms - theories and actors – “rational” and “less rational” approaches

- *C. Lindblom (1959), 'The science of muddling through', *Public Administration Review* 19:2, pp.79-88.
- *C. Lindblom (1979), 'Still muddling, not yet through', *Public Administration Review*, 39:6, pp.517-526.
- *Shepsle, K.A. And M.S. Boncheck (1997), *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions* (New York: W.W. Norton), ch.1&2.
- *Allison, G. T. (1969) "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis" *American Political Science Review*, 63:3, pp.689-718
- *J. Bendor and T. Hammond (1992) 'Rethinking Allison's models', *American Political Science Review* 86 (June): 301- 22.
- *P. John (2012) *Analyzing Public Policy* 2nd edition (London: Routledge), ch.6

Further General Introductory Reading

- Parsons, W. (1995) *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar), Part 1
- Sabatier, P. A. (2007) "The Need for Better Theories", ch.1, pp.3-17 in Sabatier, P. A. (Ed.) *Theories of the Policy Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press)
- Goodin, R.E. (1981) *Political Theory & Public Policy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), ch.2

Seminar Question:

Is '*homo economicus*' a good starting point for the study of public policy?

2. Collective Action, Interest Groups and Cooperation (MG: 7 Oct)

What is meant by 'collective action'? - How might it become a problem? If individuals are rational, does it not follow that groups are rational? - If not, why not? How does it come about that collective actions problems are solved?

- *John, Peter (2012) *Analyzing Public Policy* (Abingdon: Routledge), chapters 4 and 6.
- Modern discussions of collective action often start with the work of Mancur Olson. The core theoretical ideas are conveniently summarised in:
- *Olson, M. (1982) *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press) chs 2-3.
- A useful survey of Olson's work is:
- *McLean, I. (2000) 'The Divided Legacy of Mancur Olson', *British Journal of Political Science* 30:4, pp.651-68.

Further Reading

- Olson, M. (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press).
- Olson, M. (2000) *Power and Prosperity* (New York: Perseus Books).
- Axelrod, R. (1984) *The Evolution of Cooperation* (London: Penguin).
- Barry, B. (1978) *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Chong, D. (1991) *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

- Hardin, R. (1982) *Collective Action* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press).
- King, D.S. and Wickham-Jones, M. (1990) 'Social Democracy and Rational Workers' *British Journal of Political Science* 20:3, pp.387-92.
- McLean, I. (1987) *Public Choice* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), ch 4
- Mitra, S. (1995) 'The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in Comparative Perspective' *British Journal of Political Science* 25:1, pp.57-77.
- Moe, T. (1978) *The Organization of Interests* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Ostrom, Elinor (1992) *Governing the Commons* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Sandler, T. (1992) *Collective Action* (New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf).
- Sandler, T. (1997) *Global Challenges* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Scott, A. (1990) *Ideology and the New Social Movements* (London: Unwin Hyman).
- Tarrow, S.G. (1988) 'National Politics and Collective Action' *Annual Review of Sociology* 14, pp.421-40.
- Tarrow, S.G. (1998) *Power in Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, second edition).

Seminar Case Study: Climate Change

How far are the predictions derivable from Olson's theory of collective action borne out by empirical evidence in the case of climate change policy? How far can we generalise about collective action in policy making?

*Harris, Paul G. (2007) 'Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime Failure', *Natural Resources Journal*, 47, pp. 195-224.

3. Spatial Theories of Voters and Politicians (TH: 14 Oct)

Voting as a form of collective choice – the median voter theorem – the dimensionality of political competition – stability and instability in policy

- *Downs, A. (1957) "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy" *Journal of Political Economy*, 65:2, pp.135-150
- *Grofman, B. (2004) "Downs and Two-Party Convergence" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 7:1, 25-46
- *Weale, A. (1992) 'Democracy' in S Hargreaves Heap et al. *The Theory of Choice*, pp.199-227.
- *Riker, W. H. (1984) "The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice" *American Political Science Review*, 78:1, 1-16.
- *McLean, I. (2002) 'William H. Riker and the Invention of Herethetic(s)' *British Journal of Political Science* 32:3, 535-58.

Further Reading

- Budge, I. et al. (2001) *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Congleton, R. D. (2003) "The Median Voter Model", in Rowley, C. K. & Schneider, F. (Eds.), *The Encyclopedia of Public Choice* (Springer US), pp.707-712
- Enelow, J. M. and Hinich, M. J. (1984) *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
- McDonald, M.D., Mendes, S.M. and Budge, I. (2004) 'What Are Elections For? Conferring the Median Mandate', *British Journal of Political Science*, 34: 1, pp.1-26.

McDonald, Michael D. and Budge, Ian. (2005) *Elections, Parties, Democracy: Conferring the Median Mandate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

McLean, Iain (1987) *Public Choice* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

McLean, Iain (2001) *Rational Choice and British Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

McLean, Iain (2006) 'The Dimensionality of Party Ideologies' in Judith Bara and Albert Weale (eds), *Democratic Politics and Party Competition: Essays in Honour of Ian Budge* (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 127-42.

Mueller, D.C. (2003) *Public Choice III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Nagel, Jack H. (2006) 'Occam no, Archimedes yes' in Judith Bara and Albert Weale (eds), *Democratic Politics and Party Competition: Essays in Honour of Ian Budge* (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 143-58.

Riker, W.H. (1980) 'Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions' *American Political Science Review* 74:2, 432-46

Riker, W.H. (1986) *The Art of Political Manipulation* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).

Weale, A. (1984) 'Social Choice versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker's Political Theory' *British Journal of Political Science* 14:3, 369-85.

Weale, A. (1995) 'William Riker and the Theory of Democracy' *Democratization* 2:3, 377-95.

Wittman, D. A. (1983) "Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories" *American Political Science Review*, 77:1, 142-157

The Classic Works in Spatial Theory

Black, D. (1958) *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), now reprinted as Black, D. (1998) *The Theory of Committees and Elections*, edited I. McLean et al. (Boston, Dordrecht and London: Kluwer).

Downs, A. (1957) *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row).

Riker, W.H. (1982) *Liberalism Against Populism*, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company).

Seminar Case Study: Economic Reform in New Zealand

What general insights into major economic reform are provided by Nagel's study of neoliberal reforms in New Zealand? How far can the approach be applied to other cases of public policy?

*Nagel, J.H. (1998) 'Social Choice in a Pluritarian Democracy' *British Journal of Political Science*, 28: 2, 223-67

McLean, I. and Bustani, C. (1999) 'Irish Potatoes and British Politics: Interests, Ideology, Heresthetic and the Repeal of the Corn Laws', *Political Studies* 47:5, 817-86.

Nagel, J.H. (1993) 'Populism, Heresthetics and Political Stability', *British Journal of Political Science* 23: 2, 139-174.

4. Institutional Approaches with Rational Actors (TH: 21 Oct)

The place of institutions in collective choice and policy-making – structure-induced equilibrium – varieties of institutions – institutions as constraints and institutions as facilitators – the concentration and dispersal of political power.

*Shepsle, K. A. & Weingast, B. R. (1981) "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice" *Public Choice*, 37:3, 503-519

*Tsebelis, G. (1995) "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism" *British Journal of Political Science*, 25, 289-325

*Thelen, K. (1999) "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2, 369-404

*Pierson, P. (2000) "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics" *American Political Science Review*, 94:2, 251-267

Further Reading

John, Peter (2012) *Analyzing Public Policy* (Abingdon: Routledge), chapter 3.

Capoccia, G. & Kelemen, R. D. (2007) "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism" *World Politics*, 59:3, 341-369

Kay, A. (2005) "A Critique of the Use of Path Dependency in Policy Studies" *Public Administration*, 83:3, 553-571

Krehbiel, K. (1988) "Spatial Models of Legislative Choice" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 13:3, 259-319.

Krehbiel, K. (1996) "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government" *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 8:1, 7-40

Krehbiel, K. (1998) *Pivotal Politics* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press).

Mahoney, J. (2000) "Path dependence in historical sociology" *Theory and Society*, 29:4, 507-548

Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. (2005) *The Economic Effects of Constitutions* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

Peters, B. G. (2005) *Institutional Theory in Political Science* (Continuum)

Pierson, P. (2004) *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press)

Pierson, P. & Skocpol, T. (2002) "Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science" in Katznelson, I. & Milner, H. V. (Eds.) *Political Science: State of the Discipline*, (W. W. Norton & Company)

Rothstein, Bo 'Political Institutions: An Overview' in Goodin, Robert E. and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (eds.) (1996) *A New Handbook of Political Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.133-66.

Sydow, Jö., Schreyögg, G. & Koch, J. (2009) "Organizational Path Dependence: Opening the Black Box" *Academy of Management Review*, 34:4, 689-709

Tsebelis, G. (2002) *Veto Players* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Applications to Specific Policies and Types of Policies

There is also a considerable public policy literature on how the institutional configuration of a country's political system constrains and enables certain types of policies.

Dyson, K. *The State Tradition in Western Europe* (Oxford: Robertson, 1980).

Gourevitch, P.G. *Politics in Hard Times* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).

P A Hall *Governing the Economy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986).

P J Katzenstein *Corporatism and Change* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).

D King *Actively Seeking Work: The Politics of Unemployment Policy and Welfare Policy in the United States and Great Britain* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1995).

H Kitschelt 'Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies' *British Journal of Political Science* 14:1 (1986) pp.57-85

T J Lowi (1964) 'American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory' *World Politics* pp.677-715

J J Richardson ed., *Policy Styles in Western Europe* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982).

B Rothstein *The Social Democratic State: Bureaucracy and Social Reforms in Swedish Labor Market and School Policy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996).

Scharpf, F.W. (1988) 'The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Union' *Public Administration* 66:3, pp.229-78.

Scharpf, F.W. (1989) 'Decision Rules, Decision Styles and Policy Choices' *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1:2, pp.149-76

S Steinmo, K Thelen and F Longstreth eds, *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutions in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

S Steinmo *Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993).

Tsebelis, G. (2002) *Veto Players* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Seminar Case Study: Comparative Health Policy Reform

How would we give an institutionalist analysis of the 'patchwork' quality of US health care reform?

*Marmor, Theodore and Oberlander, Jonathan (2011) 'The Patchwork: Health Reform, American Style', *Social Science and Medicine*, 72, pp. 125-28.

See also:

Marmor, Theodore and Klein, Rudolf (2012) *Politics, Health, and Health Care: Selected Essays* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 127-51.

Hicks, T. (2013) "Partisan Strategy and Path Dependence: The Post-War Emergence of Health Systems in the UK and Sweden" *Comparative Politics*, 45:2, 207-226

E M Immergut (1992) *Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

5. Bureaucrats and Delegation (TH: 28 Oct)

Public choice approaches - Bureaucrats as rational actors – The influence of utility maximising strategies on the policy process – rent-seeking, policy and budget maximising strategies.

*T. Moe (1984), 'The new economics of organization', *American Journal of Political Science*, 28 (November): 739-777.

*Niskanen, W.A. (1991), "A Reflection on Bureaucracy and Representative Government", ch.1 in Blais, A. and S. Dion (1991) *The Budget Maximizing Bureaucrat* (University of Pittsburgh).

*M. McCubbins, R. Noll, and B. Weingast (1987), 'Administrative procedures as instruments of political control', *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organisation* 3: 243-277.

*Dunleavy, P. (1985) "Bureaucrats, Budgets and the Growth of the State: Reconstructing an Instrumental Model", *British Journal of Political Science*, 15:3, pp.299-328

Further Reading

Blais, and S. Dion (1991) *The Budget Maximizing Bureaucrat* (University of Pittsburgh)

N. Crowther-Hunt and P. Kellner (1980), *Civil Servants: An Inquiry into Britain's Ruling Class* (Raven Books)

Dunsire, A., C. Hood, M. Huby (1989), *Cutback Management in Public Bureaucracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Dunleavy P. (1991), *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice* (Harvester/Prentice Hall), chs.6-8.

D. Epstein, and S. O'Halloran (1999), *Delegating Powers. A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University).

Franchino, F. (2004) "Delegating Powers in the European Community", *British Journal of Political Science*, 34:2, pp.269-293

M. McCubbins, Roger Noll, and T Schwartz (1984), 'Congressional oversight overlooked: police versus fire alarms', *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 165-79.

Mueller, D.C. (2003), *Public Choice III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), ch.16.

Niskanen, W. A. (1971), *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* (New York: Aldine-Atherton).

B. Weingast and M.J. Moran, 'Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policy-making by the Federal Trade Commission', *Journal of Political Economy*, 91:5 765-800.

Seminar Case Study: Managing Agencies in the UK

Discuss the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats when reforming and managing agencies in the UK

D. Marsh, J. Smith, and D. Richards (2000) 'Bureaucrats, Politicians and Reform in Whitehall: Analysing the Bureau-Shaping Model', *British Journal of Political Science*, 30: 461-482.

Dowding, K. & James, O. (2004) "Analysing Bureau-Shaping Models: Comments on Marsh, Smith and Richards", *British Journal of Political Science*, 34:1, pp.183-189

O. James (2006), 'Agencies: How governments do things through semi-autonomous organizations', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 16 (1): 43-145

O. James (2003), *The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall: Public Interest versus Bureau-shaping Perspectives* (Palgrave Macmillan).

O. James et al (2011), 'Performance, Stakeholder Stability and the Survival of UK Executive Agencies', http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/conferences/pmrc/Files/James_PerformancestakeholderstabilityandthesurvivalofUKexecutiveagencies.pdf

-----6. READING WEEK: NO LECTURES OR SEMINARS-----

7. Bounded Rationality (TH: 11 Nov)

Uncertainty and bounded rationality – organizational process – social interaction and groupthink.

*Goodin, R.E. (1981) *Political Theory & Public Policy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), ch.2

*B. Jones (2003), 'Bounded Rationality and Political Science: Lessons from Public Administration', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, October, 13:4, pp.395-412.

*J. Padgett (1980), 'Bounded rationality in policy research', *American Political Science Review* 74: pp.354-72.

*Simon, H. A. (1955) "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 69:1, pp.99-118

*Simon, H.A. (1985) 'Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science' *American Political Science Review* 79:2, pp.293-304.

Further Reading

Allison, G. and Zelikow, P. (1999) *Essence of Decision* (New York: Longman, second edition).

B. Allyn, J. Blight and D. Welch, 'Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana and the Cuban Missile Crisis', *International Security*, 14(3), Winter 1989/1990, p. 164.

Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve (1986) 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making', *British Journal of Political Science* 16:3, pp. 269-86.

Janis, I.L. (1982) *Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company).

Kato, J. (1996) 'Institutions and Rationality in Politics - Three Varieties of Neo-Institutionalists', *British Journal of Political Science* 26:4, 553-82.

March, J. G. (1978) "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice" *Bell Journal of Economics*, 9:2, 587-608

D. Munton and D. Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

L. Scott (ed.), Fifty Years Beyond the Brink: Writing the Cuban Missile Crisis, *International Relations*, September 2012; 26 (3)

Seminar Case Study: High Level Foreign Policy Decisions

How would you evaluate the importance of uncertainty, groupthink and analogy in important foreign policy decisions? Should we expect decision making on domestic issues to be different?

*Houghton, David Patrick (1996) 'The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations', *British Journal of Political Science*, 26: 4, pp. 523-55.

*Smith, Steve (1985) 'Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission', *British Journal of Political Science*, 15: 1, pp. 117-23.

*Yetiv, S. (2003) 'Groupthink and the Gulf Crisis', *British Journal of Political Science* 33:3, 419-42.

8. Ideas and Sociological Institutionalism (MG: 18 Nov)

The role of ideas in the policy process - policy paradigms and the structure of belief systems in public policy – changes in belief systems – ideas and interests.

*John, Peter (2012) *Analyzing Public Policy* (Abingdon: Routledge), chapter 7.

*Weale, Albert (2010) 'Political Theory and Practical Public Reasoning', *Political Studies* 58:2, pp. 266-81.

*Daniel Béland (2009) Ideas, institutions, and policy change, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16:5, 701-718

*P.A. Hall and R.C.R. Taylor 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms' *Political Studies* 44:5 (1996) pp.936-57

Further Reading

Jenkins-Smith, H.C. and Sabatier, Paul A. (1994) 'Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework' *Journal of Public Policy* 14, pp.175-203

King, A. (1973a) 'Ideas, Institutions, and the Policies of Governments: A Comparative Analysis. Parts I and II' *British Journal of Political Science* 3:3 (1973), pp.291-313.

King, A. (1973b) 'Ideas, Institutions, and the Policies of Governments: A Comparative Analysis. Part III' *British Journal of Political Science* 3:4, pp.409-23.

Majone, G. (1989) *Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).

Majone, G. 'Public Policy and Administration: Ideas, Interests and Institutions' in Goodin and Klingemann, *New Handbook*, pp.610-27.

Sabatier, P.A. (1987) 'Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning and Policy Change: An Advocacy Coalition Framework' *Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization* 8:4, pp.64-92.

See also the symposium 'Towards Better Theories of the Policy Process' in *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24: 2 (1991)

P A Sabatier and H C Jenkins-Smith (eds) *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993).

C Radaelli 'The Role of Knowledge in the Policy Process' *Journal of European Public Policy* 2 (1995) pp.159-83

The article by Hall and Taylor is discussed with a reply in the following:

C. Hay and D. Wincott, 'Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism', *Political Studies* 46: 5 (1998), 951-57.

P.A. Hall and R.C.R. Taylor, 'The Potential of Historical Institutionalism: A Response to Hay and Wincott', *Political Studies* 46: 5 (1998), 958-62.

For some specific examples of how ideas might play a role in policy formation, see among many others:

Blyth, M. (2002) *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Colin Hay (2004) Ideas, interests and institutions in the comparative political economy of great transformations, *Review of International Political Economy*, 11:1, 204-226

Sven Steinmo (2003) 'The evolution of policy ideas: tax policy in the twentieth century' *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 2003, pp. 206-236

Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (1999) *The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Hall, Peter A. (ed.) (1980) *The Political Power of Economic Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Hajer, Maarten (1995) *The Politics of Environmental Discourse* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

H Hecla *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995).

J W Kingdon *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies* (New York and Harlow: Longman, 1995, 2nd edition).

Skidelsky, R. (1970) *Politicians and the Slump* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).

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