

Parties and Public Policy
(Or, ‘Does It Matter Which Party Gets Elected?’)
(PO8014)

Module Provider

Dr Tim Hicks
Department of Political Science,
Trinity College, Dublin
tim.hicks@tcd.ie
<http://tim.hicks.me.uk/teaching/>
Office hours: Tuesdays 11am-1pm (or by appointment)

Seminars

Mondays, 2–4pm, Phoenix House, Room 201

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Course Description

It seems important to establish whether it matters which party gets elected. While it may be natural to think that it does matter, are there good theoretical reasons to think this is true? Does the empirical literature support the contention? In pursuing answers to these questions, this course has a number of aims. The first is to provide an overview of the literature on the ‘partisanship effect’, and to connect it to some prominent and related theoretical and empirical work in the broader political science literature. The second aim is to develop some comparative knowledge of important aspects of public policy in several advanced industrialised economies. How large is government and why? What explains the extent of the welfare state? In what ways does government influence the provision of services like education and healthcare? The third aim is to use examples to develop an understanding of aspects of social science methodology — most particularly the distinction between correlation and causation.

Learning Outcomes

- Have a critical understanding of core political science theories relating to the median voter and partisanship;
- Have a detailed knowledge of the empirical literature that has applied and tested these theories;
- Have a comparative grounding in major public policies and societal outcomes across advanced industrialised democracies;
- Have an understanding of the conceptual and empirical implications of the distinction between correlation and causation in the social sciences.

Assessment

Note, all written work must be submitted through <http://turnitin.com/>, for which details are provided below. Deadlines refer to Irish time. Late papers are penalized at a rate of 5 points per day late, which will only be excused if backed by a medical certificate. Where specified, word counts do not include the bibliography but do include all other words (e.g. footnotes, etc). Please include a word count when you submit.

10% — Class participation

Class participation requires contributing to class discussion. This includes listening to others, having questions for discussion, and demonstrating that contributions are based on a detailed reading of the assigned literature for the week. Depending on class numbers, it may also involve, at my discretion, giving short presentations in class outlining readings or issues that arise from them.

20% — Response papers

Due midday of the Sunday before class

You are required to write **four response papers** over the course of the module. Response papers are not summaries, but demonstrate an understanding and provide a critique of, or response to, the week's readings. They can be written about one of the required readings, but will often be more successful when discussing the relationships between more than one reading. Response papers should be at least one but no more than three double-spaced pages long. When you submit a response paper, you are expected to be particularly active in the discussion that week and the grade for the response paper will take this into account. You should come to the seminar expecting to talk about the views expressed in the response paper of your own volition, or as a result of explicit questioning from me.

20% — Election 'Op-Ed' (up to 1,500 words)

Due midday Monday November 11th (i.e. the Monday after study week)

You will write a short opinion/editorial ('op-ed') paper on the outcome of an election — upcoming or in the recent past. The particular line that you take is up to you, but it should draw on the theoretical and empirical work that we cover during this module. You are welcome to discuss this with me before you start writing.

The idea behind this assignment is that you will attempt to write as a social scientist, in an evidence-based and theoretically-motivated way. This much is similar to other essays you may have written during your university career. However, for this assignment, you should also write in a style that is accessible to a general readership, untrained to the level that you are. The goal is that you will learn to bridge the gap between the academic study of social science and popular understandings of such issues.

50% — Research Design Paper (up to 4,000 words)

Due midday Monday December 16th (i.e. the Monday after the final week of teaching)

You should choose a case or selection of cases to study in a research-oriented way. This may involve selecting a country or countries, or perhaps sub-national levels of government. I suggest that a specific policy or outcome, as well as a time point or period, is selected to limit the empirical task. The paper should develop a theoretically-justified hypothesis relating to the concept of the partisanship effect — which may be a prediction of no effect. The testing of this hypothesis should

then be discussed in detail. Conceptually, what sort of data could be used to test the theory? Practically, what sort of data is (or is likely to be) available that might serve this purpose? Would this data allow for causal claims, or merely show correlation? Finally, the case(s) should be probed empirically, to the extent that data availability allows. *I strongly suggest that students see me no later than the end of week 8 to discuss this assignment.*

Additional Details

Plagiarism

You are reminded of your obligations as a student at Trinity College to avoid plagiarism and respect the highest standards of academic honesty. This is particularly important in terms of reviewing academic literature where it is important that the review is based on your own reading and assessment of any literature discussed.

Turnitin

All written work must be submitted via <http://www.turnitin.com/>. This makes it easier to manage submissions, as well as taking advantage of a plagiarism detector. In order to submit your essay on <http://www.turnitin.com/>, you need to register yourself with <http://www.turnitin.com/> using the following information:

Class Name: Parties and Public Policy (P08014) - 2013

Course ID: 7020613

Enrollment Password: allthesame

Finding Readings

- The reading list (below) includes full bibliographic references to each article, chapter, book, or other reading. As such, you should be able to use the library services to find them yourself.
- Where available, I have also included the URL based on the DOI (standing for Digital Object Identifier) of the reading. This will link you to *one* place where the reading is published online.
- The DOI links will only provide you with access when you are connected to the TCD network. If you are off-campus, you should use the Library's off-campus facility by visiting <http://www.tcd.ie/Library/> and clicking on the link for "E-Journals only".
- Note, however, that the DOI link may *not* be the place through which the TCD subscription provides access. (This is not in my control.) If this occurs, you will often find that <http://www.jstor.org/> will work for you, subject to you being on-campus or having explicitly signed-in to the Library's off-campus service.
- Again, where available, I have also tried to provide URLs for readings that are not constrained by off-campus and/or login restrictions. This is often via the web sites of the authors of the readings and will tend to be the easiest way of retrieving items.
- Some readings may only be available in hard copy. In these cases, I will endeavour to make them available as scanned PDFs via the module's Blackboard site found via <http://mymodule.tcd.ie/>. These are marked with the ➡ symbol in the reading list.
- Some of the readings listed below are a little more challenging. I have marked these with the * symbol.

- Some of the ‘readings’ in the ‘Short/Popular’ category are actually podcasts or other types of audio or video. I have marked these with the “” symbol.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the following for their help in preparing this course: Koji Kagotani, Gail McElroy, Tom Pegram, and Will Phelan.

1 Introductions

1.1 The Partisanship Hypothesis

Define the ‘partisanship hypothesis’ as the idea that the party that gets elected *does* make a difference to (as yet undefined) outcomes. This seems natural enough when we think of different parties competing for votes in elections by declaring themselves to be different from their opponents. This week we look at some of the theoretical underpinnings for and against the partisanship hypothesis. The first two readings are from the popular press and provide example applications of these prominent theories. Stokes (1999) provides a nice overview of political science understanding of political parties. Congleton (2003) and Grofman (2004) set out the ‘median-voter’ reasoning commonly associated with Downs (1957). Hibbs (1977) provides one of the most highly-cited examples of an argument for the partisanship hypothesis — in fact, one of the most highly-cited political science papers of all time. The *Mother Jones* Romney videos provide a nice opportunity to discuss the issues at hand in a very up-to-date way.

Short/Popular Readings (Required)

- Cowen, Tyler (2010). “Why Politics Is Stuck in the Middle”. *New York Times*. February 6th.
URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/business/economy/07view.html>
- Klein, Ezra (2011). “The 2012 election: Why it matters more than most”. *Washington Post*. September 13th.
URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-2012-election-why-it-matters-more-than-most/2011/09/12/gIQA5gt2NK_story.html
- “” Corn, David (Sept. 2012). *SECRET VIDEO: Romney Tells Millionaire Donors What He REALLY Thinks of Obama Voters*. Published by ‘Mother Jones’.
URL: <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/secret-video-romney-private-fundraiser>

Required Readings

- Stokes, Susan C. (1999). “Political Parties and Democracy”. *Annual Review of Political Science* 2.1, pp. 243–267.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.243>.
URL: <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~zshiple/pol431/PoliticalParties.pdf>
- Congleton, Roger D. (2003). “The Median Voter Model”. In: *The Encyclopedia of Public Choice*. Ed. by Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider. Springer US, pp. 707–712.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_142.
URL: <http://rdc1.net/forthcoming/medianvt.pdf>
- Grofman, Bernard (2004). “Downs and Two-Party Convergence”. *Annual Review of Political Science* 7.1, pp. 25–46.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104711>.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/6hy72qw>
- Hibbs, Douglas A. (1977). “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy”. *American Political Science Review* 71.4, pp. 1467–1487.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1961490>.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/m8pu4yu>

1.2 Sources of Partisanship: The Party Base

While the median-voter theory has been extremely influential, it is largely perceived as being at odds with partisanship approaches. For the next three weeks, we consider possible reasons why the partisanship approach may be relevant. This week, the readings are focused on reasons why it might be difficult for party leaders to engage in median voter convergence due to the preferences of their activist/party base. Can parties go against their own core supporters in search of the median voter?

Short/Popular Readings (Required)

- Epstein, Richard (2010). “The Tea Party Meets The Median Voter”. *Forbes*. September 20th.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/cxkdhz1>

Required Readings

- Strøm, Kaare (1990). “A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties”. *American Journal of Political Science* 34.2, pp. 565–598.
URL: <http://notecrom.com/content/files/718/file.pdf>
- Norris, Pippa (1995). “May’s Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited”. *Party Politics* 1.1, pp. 29–47.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068895001001002>
- Katz, Richard S and Peter Mair (1995). “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party”. *Party Politics* 1.1, pp. 5–28.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068895001001001>
- Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson (2005). “Abandoning the Middle: The Bush Tax Cuts and the Limits of Democratic Control”. *Perspectives on Politics* 3.01, pp. 33–53.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592705050048>.
URL: <http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/hackerpierson.pdf>

Further Readings

- May, John D. (1973). “Opinion Structure of Political Parties: The Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity”. *Political Studies* 21.2, pp. 135–151.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1973.tb01423.x>
- * Aldrich, John H. (1983). “A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism”. *American Political Science Review* 77.4, pp. 974–990
- * Alesina, Alberto (1988). “Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters”. *American Economic Review* 78.4, 796–805
- ➡ Kitschelt, Herbert (1989). “The Internal Politics of Parties: The Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited”. *Political Studies* 37.3, pp. 400–421.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1989.tb00279.x>
- Aldrich, John H. (1995). *Why parties? The origin and transformation of party politics in America*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
- Mulé, Rosa (1997). “Explaining the Party-Policy Link”. *Party Politics* 3.4, pp. 493–512.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068897003004003>

- Kitschelt, Herbert (2000). “Citizens, politicians, and party cartellization: Political representation and state failure in post-industrial democracies”. *European Journal of Political Research* 37.2, pp. 149–179.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007005219943>
- Miller, Gary and Norman Schofield (2003). “Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States”. *American Political Science Review* 97.2 (02), pp. 245–260.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017.S0003055403000650>.
URL: https://polisci.wustl.edu/files/polisci/imce/z.91.nsf_.apsrmay2003.pdf
- Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair (2009). “The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement”. *Perspectives on Politics* 7 (04), pp. 753–766.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592709991782>

1.3 Sources of Partisanship: Information

Median voter convergence by parties is based on the idea that voters have political and policy knowledge — that there is something for parties to converge upon. Does the electorate know enough to even have meaningful policy preferences on which parties could converge even if they wanted to? If they don't, what does that imply about the possibility for partisanship effects on policy outputs?

Short/Popular Readings (Required)

- Bartels, Larry M. (2008). “The Irrational Electorate”. *Washington Quarterly*.
URL: http://www.princeton.edu/~bartels/how_stupid.pdf

Required Readings

- Downs, Anthony (1957). “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy”. *Journal of Political Economy* 65.2, 135–150.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1827369>.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/5t624rz>
- Lupia, Arthur (1994). “Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections”. *American Political Science Review* 88.1, pp. 63–76.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2944882>.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/3gppa85>
- Bartels, Larry M. (2005). “Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind”. *Perspectives on Politics* 3.01, pp. 15–31.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592705050036>
- Lupia, Arthur et al. (2007). “Were Bush Tax Cut Supporters ‘Simply Ignorant’? A Second Look at Conservatives and Liberals in ‘Homer Gets a Tax Cut’”. *Perspectives on Politics* 5.04, pp. 773–784.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707072210>
- Bartels, Larry M. (2007). “Homer Gets a Warm Hug: A Note on Ignorance and Extenuation”. *Perspectives on Politics* 5.04, pp. 785–790.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707072222>
- Lenz, Gabriel S. and Chappell Lawson (2011). “Looking the Part: Television Leads Less Informed Citizens to Vote Based on Candidates’ Appearance”. *American Journal of Political Science* 55.3, pp. 574–589.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00511.x>.
URL: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/7536991/looking_the_part.pdf

Further Readings

- Bartels, Larry M. (1996). “Pooling Disparate Observations”. *American Journal of Political Science* 40.3, pp. 905–942
- Lupia, Arthur and Mathew D. McCubbins (1998). *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
- Benz, Matthias and Alois Stutzer (2004). “Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? — Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland”. *Public Choice*

119.1-2, pp. 31–59.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000024161.44798.ef>

- Ballew, Charles C. and Alexander Todorov (2007). “Predicting political elections from rapid and unreflective face judgments”. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 104.46, pp. 17948–17953.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0705435104>
- King, Amy and Andrew Leigh (2009). “Beautiful Politicians”. *Kyklos* 62.4, pp. 579–593.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.2009.00452.x>
- Caplan, Bryan (2011). *The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1.4 Sources of Partisanship: Economic Voting

Median voter convergence by parties is based on a spatial model of politics — typically left–right or liberal–conservative. What if parties do not really compete over a political dimension of this sort? What if elections are really determined by voters’ perceptions of economic competence of parties and their leaders? Does this create an opening for partisanship effects to flourish, or demonstrate that party differences are of little consequence?

This week, we are privileged to have the seminar led by Michael Lewis-Beck. He is a world-renowned expert on economic voting, has published very widely, and is extremely well-cited. A reading list will be circulated for this week at a later date.

Michael Lewis-Beck

Michael S. Lewis-Beck is F. Wendell Miller Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa. His interests are comparative elections, election forecasting, political economy, and quantitative methodology. Professor Lewis-Beck has authored or co-authored over 200 articles and books, including *Economics and Elections*, *The American Voter Revisited*, *French Presidential Elections*, *Forecasting Elections*, *The French Voter*, and *Applied Regression*. He has served as Editor of the *American Journal of Political Science* and of the Sage QASS series (the green monographs) in quantitative methods. Currently he is Associate Editor of *International Journal of Forecasting and Data Editor of French Politics*.

2 Partisan Correlation?

2.1 Size of Government

In this part of the course, we will study some of the earlier attempts to assess how the partisanship hypothesis performs empirically. The weeks are broken up into papers that analyse different types of outcome that could be expected to be influenced by partisanship. In this first week, we look at whether partisanship influences the ‘size of government’ — defined as the government expenditure (or revenues) as a share of the total economy. Scheve and Stasavage (2010) provide an alternative argument that could be used to explain the size of the state — but note the slightly different dependent variable that they study!

Short/Popular Readings (Required)

- The Economist (Jan. 2010). *Leviathan stirs again: The growth of the state*. January 1st.
URL: <http://www.economist.com/node/15328727>

Required Readings

- Cameron, David R. (1978). “The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis”. *American Political Science Review* 72.4, pp. 1243–1261.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1954537>
- Blais, André, Donald E. Blake, and Stéphane Dion (1993). “Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies”. *American Journal of Political Science* 37.1, pp. 40–62.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111523>
- ➡ Schmidt, Manfred G. (1996). “When parties matter: A review of the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy”. *European Journal of Political Research* 30, pp. 155–183.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb00673.x>
- Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage (2010). “The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation”. *International Organization* 64.04, pp. 529–561.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818310000226>

Further Readings

- Rice, Tom W. (1986). “The Determinants of Western European Government Growth 1950–1980”. *Comparative Political Studies* 19.2, 233–257.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414086019002004>
- Swank, Duane H. (1988). “The Political Economy of Government Domestic Expenditure in the Affluent Democracies, 1960–80”. *American Journal of Political Science* 32.4, 1120–1150.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111203>
- Blais, André, Donald E. Blake, and Stéphane Dion (1996). “Do Parties Make a Difference? A Reappraisal”. *American Journal of Political Science* 40.2, pp. 514–520.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111635>
- Cusack, Thomas R. (1997). “Partisan politics and public finance: Changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies, 1955–1989”. *Public Choice* 91.3–4, pp. 375–395.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1004995814758>

- Tavits, Margit (2004). “The Size of Government in Majoritarian and Consensus Democracies”. *Comparative Political Studies* 37.3, pp. 340–359.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414003262068>
- * Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2005). *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. MIT Press.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/pzcvrv8>, chapter 2 and sections of chapters 6 & 8
- Pickering, Andrew and James Rockey (2011). “Ideology and the Growth of Government”. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 93.3, pp. 907–919.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00101

2.2 Welfare Expenditure

The size of government is a very broad dependent variable. If we are looking for partisanship effects on government activity, perhaps we can think of more focused variables where these effects might be stronger. If the welfare state is about redistribution from the haves to the have-nots, then it seems like a plausible policy area over which the Left and the Right might disagree.

Required Readings

- Hicks, Alexander M. and Duane H. Swank (1992). “Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-82”. *American Political Science Review* 86.3, pp. 658–674.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1964129>
- Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens (2000). “Partisan Governance, Women’s Employment, and the Social Democratic Service State”. *American Sociological Review* 65.3, pp. 323–342.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2657460>.
URL: <http://www.unc.edu/~jdsteph/documents/common/articles/ASR2000.pdf>
- Allan, James P. and Lyle Scruggs (2004). “Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies”. *American Journal of Political Science* 48.3, pp. 496–512.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00083.x>
- Rueda, David (2005). “Insider–Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties”. *American Political Science Review* 99.1, pp. 61–74.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000305540505149X>

Further Readings

- Iversen, Torben and Thomas R. Cusack (2000). “The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?” *World Politics* 52.3, pp. 313–349.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2000.0009>.
URL: <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/wp2000.pdf>
- Franzese Jr., Robert J. (2002). *Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2
- Bradley, David et al. (2003). “Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies”. *World Politics* 55.2, pp. 193–228.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25054218>.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/oqf7zcz>
- * Iversen, Torben and David Soskice (2006). “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others”. *American Political Science Review* 100.2, pp. 165–181.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055406062083>.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/k6eeb6h>

2.3 Education

Governments don't just tax and send out welfare cheques, they provide, fund, and/or facilitate important public services. How does partisanship impact these activities? Does it influence the level of resources that are made available? Does it influence the structure and design of these services? This week, we focus on education. Next week, health.

Required Readings

- Busemeyer, Marius R. (2007). "Determinants of public education spending in 21 OECD democracies, 1980-2001". *Journal of European Public Policy* 14.4, pp. 582–610.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760701314417>
- Iversen, Torben and John D. Stephens (2008). "Partisan Politics, the Welfare State, and Three Worlds of Human Capital Formation". *Comparative Political Studies* 41.4-5, pp. 600–637.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414007313117>
- Jensen, Carsten (2011a). "Capitalist Systems, Deindustrialization, and the Politics of Public Education". *Comparative Political Studies* 44.4, pp. 412–435.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414010393475>
- Ansell, Ben and Johannes Lindvall (2013). "The Political Origins of Primary Education Systems: Ideology, Institutions, and Interdenominational Conflict in an Era of Nation-Building". *American Political Science Review* 107.3, pp. 505–522.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000257>

Further Readings

- Castles, Francis G. (1989). "Explaining public education expenditure in OECD nations". *European Journal of Political Research* 17.4, pp. 431–448.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1989.tb00202.x>
- Boix, Carles (1998). *Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 3
- Ansell, Ben W. (2008). "Traders, Teachers, and Tyrants: Democracy, Globalization, and Public Investment in Education". *International Organization* 62.2, pp. 289–322.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080107>
- Busemeyer, Marius R. (2009). "Social democrats and the new partisan politics of public investment in education". *Journal of European Public Policy* 16.1, pp. 107–126.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760802453171>
- Ansell, Ben W. (2010). *From the Ballot to the Blackboard: The Redistributive Political Economy of Education*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
- Gingrich, Jane R. (2011). *Making Markets in the Welfare State: The Politics of Varying Market Reforms*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 2, 3, and 5
- Busemeyer, Marius R. and Christine Trampusch (2011). "Review Article: Comparative Political Science and the Study of Education". *British Journal of Political Science* 41.02, pp. 413–443.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123410000517>

2.4 Health

Required Readings

- ➡ Navarro, Vicente (1989). “Why some countries have national health insurance, others have national health services, and the U.S. has neither”. *Social Science & Medicine* 28.9, pp. 887–898.
[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536\(89\)90313-4](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(89)90313-4)
- Hacker, Jacob S. (1998). “The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy”. *Studies in American Political Development* 12.1, pp. 57–130.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X98001308>
- ➡ Hicks, Timothy (2013). “Partisan Strategy and Path Dependence: The Post-War Emergence of Health Systems in the UK and Sweden”. *Comparative Politics* 45.2, pp. 207–226.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.5129/001041513804634244>
- Jensen, Carsten (2011b). “Marketization via Compensation: Health Care and the Politics of the Right in Advanced Industrialized Nations”. *British Journal of Political Science* 41 (04), pp. 907–926.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123411000159>

Further Readings

- Immergut, Ellen M. (1992a). *Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/ojrk8ca>
- Immergut, Ellen M. (1992b). “The Rules of the Game: The logic of health policy-making in France, Switzerland, and Sweden”. In: *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. Ed. by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Chap. 3, pp. 57–89
- Steinmo, Sven and Jon Watts (1995). “It’s the institutions, stupid! Why comprehensive national health insurance always fails in America”. *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 20.2, pp. 329–372.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/pkx7rer>
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3 Partisan Causation?

Earlier work on the partisanship hypothesis focused on establishing the presence (or absence) of a correlation between the government-incumbency of a particular type of party (e.g. left-wing) and various outcomes. But even where there does appear to be a correlation, can we infer that the relationship is causal (from party to outcome)? Other, often later, strands of literature have taken this question more seriously. We will study some of this newer work in this final part of the course.

3.1 Parties or Public Opinion?

While party incumbency may be correlated with policy outputs, could it be that parties are simply responding to (median) public opinion? If so, can the partisanship hypothesis still be supported?

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3.2 Information and Manipulation of Public Opinion

Even if policy can be predicted from public opinion, can public opinion itself be influenced or manipulated? Can it be influenced by parties themselves? If so, what are the implications for our understanding of whether it matters which party gets elected?

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- Schneider, Sandra K. and William G. Jacoby (2005). “Elite Discourse and American Public Opinion: The Case of Welfare Spending”. *Political Research Quarterly* 58.3, pp. 367–379.
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3.3 Inference From Close Elections

Maybe accurately measuring both the preferences of the electorate and the preferences/actions of parties is too difficult, or not necessary. What if we could look at situations where it was as if the governing party was randomly assigned? Elections where the result is very close could constitute such situations. With public opinion essentially evenly divided between parties in these situations, any resulting policy shifts associated with one (type of) party could be interpreted as being caused by that (type of) party.

Required Readings

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