

Topics in Political Science
(PO4740 — Academic Year 2013/14)

Michaelmas Term

Dr Tim Hicks

Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin

tim.hicks@tcd.ie

<http://tim.hicks.me.uk/teaching/>

Hilary Term

Dr Tom Louwerse

Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin

tom.louwerse@tcd.ie

<http://www.tomlouwerse.nl/>

Document produced: October 1, 2013

This module is formed of two distinct halves. The first half is taught by Tim Hicks in Michaelmas term and is focused on ‘The Politics of Inequality’. The second half is taught by Tom Louwerse in Hilary term and is focused on ‘Challenges to Representative Democracy’. The module will be assessed by coursework ($2 \times 20\%$) through the year and a combined summer exam (60%). For the exam, students will be required to answer questions drawn from both halves of the module. The next page of this document provides a brief outline of the material that will be covered in Hilary term. The remainder of this document contains the full details of the module for Michaelmas term.

Challenges to Representative Democracy (PO4740 Hilary Term)

Hilary Term

Dr Tom Louwerse

Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin

tom.louwerse@tcd.ie

<http://www.tomlouwerse.nl/>

Office hours: *to be announced*

Classes

To be announced

Document produced: October 1, 2013

This part of the course will focus on the broad debate on the problems of representative democracy in the Western world. We will focus on five subthemes:

1. Trust in democratic institutions and politicians: Does political trust really decline? Under which conditions is trust higher or lower?
2. The strength of the representative link between citizens and politicians: Are politicians getting worse at representing peoples views? How should politicians represent citizens and do they live up to these expectations?
3. The decline of political parties and the rise of populism: Political parties lose members, but do they also start to lose their representative functions? How does the advent of populist parties challenge the traditional political parties?
4. Direct democracy: Does direct democracy form a viable alternative to representative democracy? Under what conditions can direct democratic instruments help to foster the legitimacy of democratic rule?
5. The impact of the Eurocrisis on national and European politics: What is the impact of the Euro-crisis on all of this?

We will read original research articles and book chapters. A reading list will be made available in December.

The Politics of Inequality
(PO4740 Michaelmas Term)

Michaelmas Term

Dr Tim Hicks

Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin

tim.hicks@tcd.ie

<http://tim.hicks.me.uk/teaching/>

Office hours: Tuesdays 11am-1pm (or by appointment)

Classes

Tuesdays, 3–4pm, Room 3126, Arts Building
Tuesday 6–7pm, Room 2.03, Aras an Phiarsaigh
Wednesday 10–11am Room 5012 Arts Building
Wednesday 6–7pm Room 3126 Arts Building.

Document produced: October 1, 2013

Module Description

In 2008, the top 10% of the US population received 46% of all income while in Sweden the figure was 28%. The current economic climate sees governments needing to rebalance their budgets — often dramatically. This can be achieved both by cutting spending that is often aimed more at the poor or increasing taxes that are often paid more by the rich. Unsurprisingly, then, inequality is currently very politically salient, but politics as a subject more generally has been described as the study of ‘who gets what, when, and how’. During this course, we will investigate the politics of inequality both across ‘developed democracies’ and within them. The aim is to develop an understanding of inequality in terms of its contemporary and historical patterns, its causes (both political and otherwise), and its consequences for political participation and policy outcomes.

Learning Outcomes

On successful completion of this module students should be able to:

- identify and describe empirical trends in inequality in the advanced industrial countries;
- identify and describe the economic and political causes of differences in inequality;
- identify and describe the economic and political consequences of inequality;
- critically read and evaluate social scientific arguments and evidence;
- formulate a social scientific argument and employ empirical evidence to test/support it.

Class Participation and Assessment

Note, well. I will give perhaps only two lectures during the whole module — the first of which will be in Week 1. This module is primarily seminar-based, with extensive in-class discussion. Consequently, the readings are even more important than for most modules you will have taken so far. **This module will only work for you if you complete the assigned reading before class and participate in class discussions.**

In each class, you should expect to be ready to discuss all of the required readings. You are also very welcome to raise issues from the further readings (and beyond, of course). These further readings are intended to provide you with avenues to explore, should you wish. Some topics have many more than others — perhaps reflecting some of my own biases. For the exam, I will not expect you to be able to provide detailed discussion of *all* further readings for those topics that have very many of them. On the other hand, you should not expect to be able to rely only on required readings for the exam.

Response Papers (approx 2 pages)

Due midday of the day before the relevant class

You will be assigned two topics from each term on which to write a critical response to one or more of the required readings (and further readings if you wish). The aim of these papers is not simply to provide a summary of the readings. Instead, you should focus on analyses of contradictions both within and between papers, methodological short-comings, and conceptual discrepancies. In developing such critiques, you may conclude that some arguments or pieces of evidence are more persuasive than others — which is likely to make for more interesting class discussion!

The assignments will be spread across the different topics so that each week we have (hopefully) at least one person in the class who has written a paper. Depending on the final numbers in the class, I may direct each of you to focus on particular readings so as to ensure that we have sufficient coverage each week. When it is ‘your’ week, you will be expected to participate in the seminar discussion to an even greater extent than usual.

I will also assign ‘discussants’ for each paper-writer whose task will be to discuss the issues raised in the response paper. The aim is to encourage you all to engage with each others work and ideas *in a collaborative way*. Discussion of the work of others should be sensitive and respectful but ofseries I will press you to be critical.

A grade will not be provided for these response papers, although I will read at least one per student per term and provide comments and feedback. Of course, you will also receive verbal feedback from both me and your colleagues within the class. Furthermore, I will arrange for all response papers to be posted online so that they are (only) accessible to all members of the class. I will also make my written feedback on these papers similarly available. **I want you to read each others work and learn from each other.**

Finally, while these papers are not graded, you must complete both of them in order for me to grade the assessed written work described below. These response papers should be completed before the relevant class so that you have the full experience of having them discussed.

N.B. To be clear, failure to complete two response papers during Michaelmas term will result in a zero grade for the assessed Michaelmas essay (which counts as 20% of your final module grade).

20% of combined module grade — Michaelmas Term: Essay (up to 3,000 words) Deadline to be agreed by collective class decision

You are very largely free to choose the topic of your essay. While you have freedom on the topic, you are required to develop an argument of your own relating to the politics of inequality — either generally or with respect to specific cases. You should then provide comparative (and possibly historical) evidence in support of your argument. During the course, you will be directed towards various data sets that you may find useful for the empirical component of the essay.

I strongly suggest that you see me no later than the end of week 8 of Michaelmas term to discuss this assignment. You are very welcome to talk to me about it at any time during the course, though.

20% of combined module grade — Hilary Term Paper

Details to be provided by Tom Louwerse at a later date.

60% of combined module grade — Summer Exam

A comprehensive exam on the content of both halves of the module.

Additional Details

Plagiarism

All late work, unless excused in advance by the course lecturer, or justified by medical certificate or tutors note, will be penalised at a rate of 5 marks per working day. Under no circumstances will work be accepted after the set work has been marked and handed back to other students, or after the end of the second lecture term.

To be sure that you are not inadvertently plagiarising, see the department's undergraduate handbook at http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/undergraduate/handbook.php. This also gives guidelines about how to plan and write an essay, what the markers are looking for, what qualities a good essay possesses, and what factors can result in low marks.

Turnitin

All written work must be submitted via <http://www.turnitin.com/>. This makes it easier to manage submissions, as well as taking advantage of a plagiarism detector. In order to submit your essay on <http://www.turnitin.com/>, you need to register yourself with <http://www.turnitin.com/> using the following information:

Class Name: The Politics of Inequality (P04740) - 2013-Michaelmas

Course ID: 7036584

Enrollment Password: morethanme

Finding Readings

- The reading list (below) includes full bibliographic references to each article, chapter, book, or other reading. As such, you should be able to use the library services to find them yourself.
- Where available, I have also included the URL based on the DOI (standing for Digital Object Identifier) of the reading. This will link you to *one* place where the reading is published online.
- The DOI links will only provide you with access when you are connected to the TCD network. If you are off-campus, you should use the Library's off-campus facility by visiting <http://www.tcd.ie/Library/> and clicking on the link for "E-Journals only".
- Note, however, that the DOI link may *not* be the place through which the TCD subscription provides access. (This is not in my control.) If this occurs, you will often find that <http://www.jstor.org/> will work for you, subject to you being on-campus or having explicitly signed-in to the Library's off-campus service.
- Again, where available, I have also tried to provide URLs for readings that are not constrained by off-campus and/or login restrictions. This is often via the web sites of the authors of the readings and will tend to be the easiest way of retrieving items.
- Some readings may only be available in hard copy. In these cases, I will endeavour to make them available as scanned PDFs via the module's Blackboard site found via <http://mymodule.tcd.ie/>. These are marked with the ➡ symbol in the reading list.
- Some of the readings listed below are a little more challenging. I have marked these with the * symbol.
- Some of the 'readings' in the 'Short/Popular' category are actually podcasts or other types of audio or video. I have marked these with the 🎧 symbol.

Interesting Texts

- Pontusson, Jonas (2005). *Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe vs. Liberal America*. Cornell University Press
- Alesina, Alberto and Edward L. Glaeser (2005). *Fighting poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press
- Kenworthy, Lane (2004). *Egalitarian Capitalism: Jobs, Incomes, and Growth in Affluent Countries*. Russell Sage Foundation
- Bartels, Larry M. (2008). *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Interesting Websites

- Cross-national data on income and wealth inequality is available from the Luxembourg Income (and Wealth) Study web site:
<http://www.lisdatacenter.org/>
- Cross-national and through-time data on ‘top incomes’ (going back quite a long way) is available at:
<http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes>
- Large-scale UN data from the World Income Inequality Database
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/
- Lane Kenworthy’s blog, entitled ‘Consider the Evidence’, covering all sorts of issues relating to inequality, poverty, politics, and social science more generally:
<http://lanekenworthy.net/>

Acknowledgements

I am extremely grateful to the following for their help in preparing this course: Lucy Barnes, Elaine Byrne, Kara Connolly, Michael Gallagher, Jac Hayden, Koji Kagotani, Sam Mealy, Sarah Mulcahy, Tom Pogram, and Will Phelan.

1 Income-Based Models of Politics

1.1 Inequality, Poverty, Income, and Wealth

This first week is introductory. The readings cover a few short and interesting tasters of a more ‘popular’ nature. The ‘Summary Readings’ for this week — uniquely this week not denoted as ‘required’ as I will not expect you to be able to discuss them in class — provide overviews of some of the topics that we will go on and cover in more detail during the course. For those of you contemplating whether to take this course, Neckerman and Torche (2007) point to many of the issues that we will cover later.

Shorter/Popular Readings

- Cox, W. Michael and Richard Alm (2008). “You Are What You Spend”. *New York Times*. February 10th.
URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/10/opinion/10cox.html>
- Kenworthy, Lane (Feb. 2008a). *Income Inequality, Spending Inequality, Wealth Inequality*.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/cbwm3c9>
- Kenworthy, Lane (July 2010b). *The best inequality graph, updated*. Consider the Evidence.
URL: <http://lanekenworthy.net/2010/07/20/the-best-inequality-graph-updated/>

Summary Readings

- Norton, Michael I. and Dan Ariely (2011). “Building a Better America — One Wealth Quintile at a Time”. *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 6.1, pp. 9–12.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745691610393524>.
URL: <http://duke.edu/~dandan/Papers/BuildingBetterAmerica.pdf>
- ➡ Pontusson, Jonas (2005). *Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe vs. Liberal America*. Cornell University Press, chapter 3
- Smeeding, Timothy (2006). “Poor People in Rich Nations: The United States in Comparative Perspective”. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20.1, pp. 69–90.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533006776526094>
- Kaufman, Robert R. (2009). “Inequality and Redistribution: Some Continuing Puzzles”. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 42.04, pp. 657–660.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096509990060>
- Neckerman, Kathryn M. and Florencia Torche (2007). “Inequality: Causes and Consequences”. *Annual Review of Sociology* 33.1, pp. 335–357.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131755>
- Morris, Martina and Bruce Western (1999). “Inequality in Earnings at the Close of the Twentieth Century”. *Annual Review of Sociology* 25.1, pp. 623–657.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.623>
- Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Joe Soss (2010). “The Politics of Inequality in America: A Political Economy Framework”. *Annual Review of Political Science* 13.1, pp. 341–364.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.041608.140134>
- Atkinson, Anthony B., Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez (2011). “Top Incomes in the Long Run of History”. *Journal of Economic Literature* 49.1, pp. 3–71.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.49.1.3>

(A Diversion to Quantitative Methods)

Many of the readings in the rest of the module use regression and other similar quantitative and statistical techniques. My aim is to provide you with the intuition of what these techniques do so that you are better able to understand research that uses these methods. The readings listed here are intended to provide a selection of helpful resources should you still not feel comfortable with the material after my lecture.

Helpful Readings

- ➡ Sections 2.1–2.3 of Moore, David S. and George P. McCabe (2005). *Introduction to the Practice of Statistics*. New York, NY: W.H. Freeman
- Chapter 3 of Tufte, Edward R. (1974). *Data Analysis for Politics and Policy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
URL: <http://www.edwardtufte.com/tufte/dapp/> (available for free online)
- ➡ Anscombe, F.J. (1973). “Graphs in Statistical Analysis”. *The American Statistician* 27.1, pp. 17–21
- ➡ Chapter 7 of Pollock III, Philip H. (2003). *The Essentials of Political Analysis*. Washington, DC: CQ Press

1.2 The Melzter-Richard Model

We might expect that the poorer sections of society would be more in favour of redistribution than the richer. A famous theory, commonly attributed Meltzer and Richard (1981), formalises this insight into predictions about when and why state redistribution will occur/increase/decrease. This week, we discuss this theory, and then examine some of the empirical evidence that has been brought forth to test it.

Shorter/Popular Readings (Required)

- Epstein, Richard (2010). “The Tea Party Meets The Median Voter”. *Forbes*. September 20th.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/cxkdhz1>
- “” Corn, David (Sept. 2012). *SECRET VIDEO: Romney Tells Millionaire Donors What He REALLY Thinks of Obama Voters*. Published by ‘Mother Jones’.
URL: <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/secret-video-romney-private-fundraiser>

Required Readings

- ➡ Alesina, Alberto and Edward L. Glaeser (2005). *Fighting poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, chapter 3
- Kenworthy, Lane and Leslie McCall (2008). “Inequality, public opinion and redistribution”. *Socio-Economic Review* 6.1, pp. 35–68.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwm006>
- Finseraas, Henning (2009). “Income Inequality and Demand for Redistribution: A Multilevel Analysis of European Public Opinion”. *Scandinavian Political Studies* 32.1, pp. 94–119.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2008.00211.x>

Further Readings

- * Meltzer, Allan H. and Scott F. Richard (1981). “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government”. *Journal of Political Economy* 89.5, pp. 914–927.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1830813>.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/k228ees>
- Milanovic, Branko (2000). “The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: an empirical test with the required data”. *European Journal of Political Economy* 16.3, pp. 367–410.
[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680\(00\)00014-8](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(00)00014-8)
- Borge, Lars-Erik and Jørn Rattsø (2004). “Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis”. *European Economic Review* 48.4, 805–826.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.09.003>
- McCall, Leslie and Lane Kenworthy (2009). “Americans’ Social Policy Preferences in the Era of Rising Inequality”. *Perspectives on Politics* 7.03, pp. 459–484.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592709990818>
- Milanovic, Branko (2010). “Four critiques of the redistribution hypothesis: An assessment”. *European Journal of Political Economy* 26.1, pp. 147–154.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.10.001>
- Barnes, Lucy (2013). “Does Median Voter Income Matter? The Effects of Inequality and Turnout on Government Spending”. *Political Studies* 61.1, pp. 82–100.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00952.x>

1.3 Does Income (Inequality) Structure the Electorate?

For the Meltzer and Richard (1981) model to work, income inequality needs to be *the* dimension on which politics is structured. Do we see evidence of this? As such, does economic inequality — in the form of the relative position of individuals on the income distribution — explain party/political preferences? Does this vary?

Shorter/Popular Readings

- Haidt, Jonathan (2012). “Why working-class people vote conservative”. *The Guardian*.
URL: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/jun/05/why-working-class-people-vote-conservative>

Required Readings

- ➡ Frank, Thomas (2005). *What’s the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America*. Holt McDougal, chapter 1
- Bartels, Larry M. (2006). “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with Kansas?” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1.2, pp. 201–226.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.561/100.0000001>.
URL: <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/socy/vanneman/socy789b/Bartels06.pdf>
- De La O, Ana L. and Jonathan A. Rodden (2008). “Does Religion Distract the Poor?” *Comparative Political Studies* 41.4-5, pp. 437–476.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414007313114>

Further Readings

- “” Winston, Joe, Laura Cohen, and Thomas Frank (2009). *What’s the Matter with Kansas?* Documentary film.
URL: <http://whatsthematterwithkansas.com/>
- Kitschelt, Herbert (1993). “Class Structure and Social Democratic Party Strategy”. *British Journal of Political Science* 23.3, 299–337.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400006633>
- Nieuwbeerta, Paul and Wout Ultee (1999). “Class voting in Western industrialized countries, 1945–1990: Systematizing and testing explanations”. *European Journal of Political Research* 35.1, pp. 123–160.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006974430257>
- Evans, Geoffrey (2000). “The Continued Significance of Class Voting”. *Annual Review of Political Science* 3.1, pp. 401–417.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.401>
- Knutsen, Oddbjørn (2006). *Class Voting in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books
- Gelman, Andrew et al. (2007). “Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: What’s the Matter with Connecticut”. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 2.4, pp. 345–367.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00006026>.
URL: <http://home.uchicago.edu/~bshor/research/red.blue.rich.poor.final.pdf>
- Fiorina, Morris P. and Samuel J. Abrams (2008). “Political Polarization in the American Public”. *Annual Review of Political Science* 11.1, pp. 563–588.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.153836>

- Gelman, Andrew (2009). *Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote The Way They Do*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Bafumi, Joseph and Robert Y. Shapiro (2009). “A New Partisan Voter”. *Journal of Politics* 71.01, pp. 1–24.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381608090014>.
 URL: <http://www.temple.edu/ipa/events/documents/Shapiro-paper-S0022381608090014.pdf>
- Gelman, Andrew, Lane Kenworthy, and Yu-Sung Su (2010). “Income Inequality and Partisan Voting in the United States”. *Social Science Quarterly* 91.5, pp. 1203–1219.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00728.x>.
 URL: <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/ssq2010.pdf>
- Feller, Avi, Andrew Gelman, and Boris Shor (2013). “Red State/Blue State Divisions in the 2012 Presidential Election”. *The Forum* 10.4, pp. 127–131.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/forum-2013-0014>.
 URL: http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/feller_gelman_shor_2012.pdf

1.4 Attitudes Towards Income Inequality

What explains individual-level attitudes about income differences between individuals within countries? Do these explanations vary with individual-level characteristics? Do they vary across countries?

Required Readings

- Kelley, Jonathan and M. D. R. Evans (1993). “The Legitimation of Inequality: Occupational Earnings in Nine Nations”. *American Journal of Sociology* 99.1, pp. 75–125.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2781956>
- Svallfors, Stefan (1997). “Worlds of Welfare and Attitudes to Redistribution: A Comparison of Eight Western Nations”. *European Sociological Review* 13.3, pp. 283–304.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/522616>
- Osberg, Lars and Timothy Smeeding (2006). ““Fair” Inequality? Attitudes toward Pay Differentials: The United States in Comparative Perspectives”. *American Sociological Review* 71.3, pp. 450–473.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000312240607100305>

Further Readings

- Fong, Christina (2001). “Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution”. *Journal of Public Economics* 82.2, pp. 225–246.
[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727\(00\)00141-9](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00141-9).
URL: [http://darp.lse.ac.uk/papersdb/Fong_\(JPubE_01\).pdf](http://darp.lse.ac.uk/papersdb/Fong_(JPubE_01).pdf)
- Gijsberts, Mérove (2002). “The Legitimation of Income Inequality in State-socialist and Market Societies”. *Acta Sociologica* 45.4, pp. 269–285.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000169930204500402>
- Corneo, Giacomo and Hans Peter Grüner (2002). “Individual preferences for political redistribution”. *Journal of Public Economics* 83.1, pp. 83–107.
[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727\(00\)00172-9](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00172-9)
- Alesina, Alberto and George-Marios Angeletos (2005). “Fairness and Redistribution”. *American Economic Review* 95.4, pp. 960–980
- Alesina, Alberto and Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln (2007). “Good-Bye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People’s Preferences”. *American Economic Review* 97.4, pp. 1507–1528.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282807783286766>
- * Alesina, Alberto and Paula Guiliano (Mar. 2009). “Preferences for Redistribution”. NBER Working Paper No. 14825.
URL: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14825>
- Dion, Michelle L. and Vicki Birchfield (2010). “Economic Development, Income Inequality, and Preferences for Redistribution”. *International Studies Quarterly* 54.2, pp. 315–334.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00589.x>
- Dallinger, Ursula (2010). “Public support for redistribution: what explains cross-national differences?” *Journal of European Social Policy* 20.4, pp. 333–349.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0958928710374373>

1.5 Does Public Opinion Influence (Welfare State) Policy?

We have looked at patterns and determinants of public opinion regarding redistribution and welfare state policy. We have also looked at cross-national patterns of welfare state provision. Are these policies influenced in any meaningful way by the preferences of the electorate? In a sense: does democracy ‘work’ in this sphere of policy-making?

Required Readings

- Wlezien, Christopher (1995). “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending”. *American Journal of Political Science* 39.4, pp. 981–1000.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111666>
- Brooks, Clem and Jeff Manza (2006b). “Social Policy Responsiveness in Developed Democracies”. *American Sociological Review* 71.3, pp. 474–494.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/30039000>
- Kenworthy, Lane (2009). “The effect of public opinion on social policy generosity”. *Socio-Economic Review* 7.4, pp. 727–740.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwp014>

Further Readings

- * Stimson, James A., Michael B. Mackuen, and Robert S. Erikson (1995). “Dynamic Representation”. *American Political Science Review* 89.3, 543–565.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2082973>
- Burstein, Paul (1998). “Bringing the Public Back in: Should Sociologists Consider the Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy?” *Social Forces* 77.1, pp. 27–62.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3006009>
- Powell, G. Bingham (2004). “Political Representation in Comparative Politics”. *Annual Review of Political Science* 7.1, pp. 273–296.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104815>
- Myles, Johns (2006). “Comment on Brooks and Manza, ASR, June 2006: Welfare States and Public Opinion”. *American Sociological Review* 71.3, pp. 495–498.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/30039001>
- Brooks, Clem and Jeff Manza (2006a). “Reply to Myles: Theory and Methods for Comparative Opinion/Social Policy Research”. *American Sociological Review* 71.3, pp. 499–502.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/30039002>
- Hobolt, Sara Binzer and Robert Klemmensen (2008). “Government Responsiveness and Political Competition in Comparative Perspective”. *Comparative Political Studies* 41.3, 309–337.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414006297169>
- Hakhverdian, Armèn (2010). “Political Representation and its Mechanisms: A Dynamic Left-Right Approach for the United Kingdom, 1976–2006”. *British Journal of Political Science* 40.4, pp. 835–856.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000712341000013X>

1.6 Explaining Post-Redistribution Inequality

While governments may have the ability to influence pre-tax-and-transfer inequality, it's even more natural to consider that they have the ability to influence post-tax-and-transfer inequality. How influential are the redistributive actions of the state and why do they arise?

Shorter/Popular Readings (Required)

- Lansley, Stewart (2006). "The tax-free lifestyle of Britain's new mega-wealthy is impoverishing us all". *The Guardian*. April 1st.
URL: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/apr/01/comment.politics>

Required Readings

- Korpi, Walter and Joakim Palme (1998). "The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries". *American Sociological Review* 63.5, 661–687.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2657333>
- Kenworthy, Lane and Jonas Pontusson (2005). "Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries". *Perspectives on Politics* 3.03, pp. 449–471.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592705050292>
- Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage (2010). "The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation". *International Organization* 64.04, pp. 529–561.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818310000226>

Further Readings

- Moller, Stephanie et al. (2003). "Determinants of Relative Poverty in Advanced Capitalist Democracies". *American Sociological Review* 68.1, pp. 22–51.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3088901>
- Korpi, Walter and Joakim Palme (2003). "New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975–95". *American Political Science Review* 97.3, 425–446.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000789>
- ➡ Hills, John (2004). *Inequality and the State*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, chapter 8
- Mahler, Vincent A. (2004). "Economic Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Income Inequality in the Developed Countries". *Comparative Political Studies* 37.9, pp. 1025–1053.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414004268849>
- Kenworthy, Lane (2008b). *Jobs With Equality*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press
- Rueda, David (2008). "Left Government, Policy, and Corporatism: Explaining the Influence of Partisanship on Inequality". *World Politics* 60.3, pp. 349–389
- Beramendi, Pablo and Thomas R. Cusack (2009). "Diverse Disparities: The Politics and Economics of Wage, Market, and Disposable Income Inequalities". *Political Research Quarterly* 62.2, pp. 257–275.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912908319220>
- Schmitt, John and Alexandra Mitukiewicz (2012). "Politics matter: changes in unionisation rates in rich countries, 1960–2010". *Industrial Relations Journal* 43.3, pp. 260–280.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2338.2012.00675.x>

2 Beyond Income-Based Models of Politics

2.1 The Welfare State as Insurance

So far, we have largely assumed that the welfare state is wholly or predominantly about redistributing money from one set of people to another. Is that really the right way of thinking about it? Does it make more sense to think of it as like a set of insurance policies protecting against risks that people face?

Required Readings

- Iversen, Torben and Thomas R. Cusack (2000). “The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?” *World Politics* 52.3, pp. 313–349.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2000.0009>.
URL: <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/wp2000.pdf>
- ➡ Estevez-Abe, Margarita, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice (2001). “Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State”. In: *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Ed. by Peter A. Hall & David Soskice. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Chap. 4, pp. 145–183
- Rehm, Philipp (2011). “Social Policy by Popular Demand”. *World Politics* 63.02, pp. 271–299.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887111000037>

Further Readings

- * Moene, Karl Ove and Michael Wallerstein (2001). “Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution”. *American Political Science Review* 95.4, 859–874.
URL: http://dev.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/667__wallerstein1.pdf
- * Iversen, Torben and David Soskice (2001). “An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences”. *American Political Science Review* 95.4, pp. 875–893.
URL: <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/SocialPreferences.pdf>
- Mares, Isabela (2003a). *The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development*. Cambridge University Press
- Mares, Isabela (2003b). “The Sources of Business Interest in Social Insurance: Sectoral versus National Differences”. *World Politics* 55.02, pp. 229–258.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2003.0012>
- Mares, Isabela (2005). “Social Protection Around the World: External Insecurity, State Capacity, and Domestic Political Cleavages”. *Comparative Political Studies* 38.6, pp. 623–651.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414004274403>
- Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and Philipp Rehm (2006). “Risks at Work: the Demand and Supply Sides of Government Redistribution”. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 22.3, pp. 365–389.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grj022>
- Esarey, Justin, Tim Salmon, and Charles Barrilleaux (2012). “Social Insurance and Income Redistribution in a Laboratory Experiment”. *Political Research Quarterly* 65.3, pp. 685–698.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912911411096>
- * Rehm, Philipp, Jacob S. Hacker, and Mark Schlessinger (2012). “Insecure Alliances: Risk, Inequality, and Support for the Welfare State”. *American Political Science Review* 106.2, pp. 386–406.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000147>
- Gingrich, Jane and Ben Ansell (2012). “Preferences in Context: Micro Preferences, Macro Contexts, and the Demand for Social Policy”. *Comparative Political Studies* 45.12, pp. 1624–1654.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414012463904>

2.2 Political Engagement and Information

The campaign manager of a major political party once explained to a group of campaigners that ‘you can never overestimate the ignorance of the electorate’. Whether people turnout to vote or not, there is the question of how engaged they are with the political process. Do voters possess even a baseline of information from which they may be able to form a view over who to vote for? Are there informational differences across the electorate that are related to, or explained by, economic inequality?

Shorter/Popular Readings (Required)

- Simic, Charles (Mar. 2012). *Age of Ignorance*. New York Review of Books Blog.
URL: <http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/mar/20/age-of-ignorance/>

Required Readings

- Gilens, Martin (2001). “Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences”. *American Political Science Review* 95.02, pp. 379–396.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3118127>.
URL: http://unibaker.com/media/Political_Ignorance._Martin_Gilens.pdf
- Bartels, Larry M. (2005). “Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind”. *Perspectives on Politics* 3.01, pp. 15–31.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592705050036>
- Lupia, Arthur et al. (2007). “Were Bush Tax Cut Supporters ‘Simply Ignorant’? A Second Look at Conservatives and Liberals in ‘Homer Gets a Tax Cut’”. *Perspectives on Politics* 5.04, pp. 773–784.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707072210>
- Bartels, Larry M. (2007). “Homer Gets a Warm Hug: A Note on Ignorance and Extenuation”. *Perspectives on Politics* 5.04, pp. 785–790.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707072222>
- Solt, Frederick (2008). “Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement”. *American Journal of Political Science* 52.1, pp. 48–60.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00298.x>

Further Readings

- Downs, Anthony (1957). “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy”. *Journal of Political Economy* 65.2, 135–150.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1827369>.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/5t624rz>
- Zaller, John R. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
- Galston, William A. (2001). “Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education”. *Annual Review of Political Science* 4.1, pp. 217–234.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.217>
- * Bullock, John G. (2011). “Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate”. *American Political Science Review* 105.03, pp. 496–515.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000165>.
URL: <http://bullock.research.yale.edu/papers/elite/elite.pdf>

2.3 Media Manipulation?

If political information is important, then shouldn't we also look at who provides that information?

Required Readings

- Druckman, James N., Jordan Fein, and Thomas J. Leeper (2012). "A Source of Bias in Public Opinion Stability". *American Political Science Review* 106.02, pp. 430–454.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000123>
- Gerber, Alan S., Dean Karlan, and Daniel Bergan (2009). "Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions". *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 1.2, pp. 35–52.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.1.2.35>
- Ladd, Jonathan McDonald and Gabriel S. Lenz (2009). "Exploiting a Rare Communication Shift to Document the Persuasive Power of the News Media". *American Journal of Political Science* 53.2, pp. 394–410.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00377.x>.
URL: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/7536991/exploiting_rare_shift.pdf

Further Readings

- DellaVigna, Stefano and Ethan Kaplan (2007). "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting". *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122.3, pp. 1187–1234.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.3.1187>
- Ho, Daniel E. and Kevin M. Quinn (2008). "Measuring Explicit Political Positions of Media". *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3, pp. 353–377.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00008048>.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/c82sbhn>
- Larcinese, Valentino, Riccardo Puglisi, and James M. Snyder Jr. (2011). "Partisan bias in economic news: Evidence on the agenda-setting behavior of U.S. newspapers". *Journal of Public Economics* 95.9–10, pp. 1178–1189.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.04.006>
- * Chiang, Chun-Fang and Brian Knight (2011). "Media Bias and Influence: Evidence from Newspaper Endorsements". *Review of Economic Studies* 78.3, pp. 795–820.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdq037>
- Groseclose, Tim and Jeffrey Milyo (2005). "A Measure of Media Bias". *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120.4, pp. 1191–1237.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/003355305775097542>
- Groseclose, Tim (2011). *Left Turn: How Liberal Media Bias Distorts the American Mind*. St Martin's Press
- For a symposium on the Groseclose book, try the following and its accompanying papers Farrell, Henry (2012). "Does the US Media Have a Liberal Bias?" *Perspectives on Politics* 10.03, pp. 772–774.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712001399>
- Gasper, John T. (2011). "Shifting Ideologies? Re-examining Media Bias". *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 6.1, pp. 85–102.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00010006>

- Ansolabehere, Stephen, Rebecca Lessem, and Jr. Snyder James M. (2006). “The Orientation of Newspaper Endorsements in U.S. Elections, 1940–2002”. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1.4, pp. 393–404.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00000009>
- Groeling, Timothy (2013). “Media Bias by the Numbers: Challenges and Opportunities in the Empirical Study of Partisan News”. *Annual Review of Political Science* 16.1, pp. 129–151.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-040811-115123>
- Hanretty, Chris (2010). “Explaining the De Facto Independence of Public Broadcasters”. *British Journal of Political Science* 40.01, pp. 75–89.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000712340999024X>
- Soroka, Stuart et al. (2013). “Auntie Knows Best? Public Broadcasters and Current Affairs Knowledge”. *British Journal of Political Science* 43.4, pp. 719–739.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123412000555>
- Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Rune Stubager (2010). “The Political Conditionality of Mass Media Influence: When Do Parties Follow Mass Media Attention?” *British Journal of Political Science* 40 (03), pp. 663–677.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123410000037>
- Barone, Guglielmo, Francesco D’Acunto, and Gaia Narciso (2012). “Telecracy: Testing for Channels of Persuasion”. Trinity Economics Papers tep0412, Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin.
- Smith, Glen and Kathleen Searles (2013). “Fair and Balanced News or a Difference of Opinion? Why Opinion Shows Matter for Media Effects”. *Political Research Quarterly* 66.3, pp. 671–684.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912912465922>
- Dilliplane, Susanna (2013). “Activation, Conversion, or Reinforcement? The Impact of Partisan News Exposure on Vote Choice”. *American Journal of Political Science*.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12046>
- Levendusky, Matthew S. (2013). “Why Do Partisan Media Polarize Viewers?” *American Journal of Political Science* 57.3, pp. 611–623.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12008>

2.4 Unequal Income Representation

Inequality may impact the political process not by turnout or intellectual disengagement, but by privileging certain groups. Do governments respond equally to all types of citizen? If not, can economic inequality explain this?

Required Readings

- Gilens, Martin (2005). “Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness”. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69.5, pp. 778–796.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfi058>
- Bartels, Larry M. (2008). *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chapter 4
- Giger, Nathalie, Jan Rosset, and Julian Bernauer (2012). “The Poor Political Representation of the Poor in a Comparative Perspective”. *Representation* 48.1, pp. 47–61.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2012.653238>

Further Readings

- Stigler, George J. (1970). “Director’s Law of Public Income Redistribution”. *Journal of Law and Economics* 13.1, 1–10
- Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson (2005). “Abandoning the Middle: The Bush Tax Cuts and the Limits of Democratic Control”. *Perspectives on Politics* 3.01, pp. 33–53.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592705050048>.
URL: <http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/hackerpierson.pdf>
- Ura, Joseph Daniel and Christopher R. Ellis (2008). “Income, Preferences, and the Dynamics of Policy Responsiveness”. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 41.04, pp. 785–794.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S104909650808102X>
- Soroka, Stuart N. and Christopher Wlezien (2008). “On the Limits to Inequality in Representation”. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 41.02, pp. 319–327.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096508080505>
- Gilens, Martin (2009). “Preference Gaps and Inequality in Representation”. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 42.2, pp. 335–341.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096509090441>.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/nctclqt>
- Gilens, Martin (2012). *Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Ellis, Christopher (2012). “Understanding Economic Biases in Representation: Income, Resources, and Policy Representation in the 110th House”. *Political Research Quarterly* 65.4, pp. 938–951.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912911427450>
- Rosset, Jan, Nathalie Giger, and Julian Bernauer (2013). “More Money, Fewer Problems? Cross-Level Effects of Economic Deprivation on Political Representation”. *West European Politics* 36.4, pp. 817–835.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.783353>
- Rigby, Elizabeth and Gerald C. Wright (2013). “Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in the American States”. *American Journal of Political Science* 57.3, pp. 552–565.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12007>

2.5 ‘Winner-Take-All Politics’?

This week is a little different from the others. Rather than read a selection of articles from various sources, we will read the contents of a special issue of *Politics & Society*. Hacker and Pierson (2010b) outline a broad argument (subsequently extended to a book-length treatment in Hacker and Pierson, 2011). There are a series of responses from various prominent scholars, followed by a concluding rejoinder from Hacker and Pierson.

Required Readings

- Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson (2010b). “Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States”. *Politics & Society* 38.2, pp. 152–204.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329210365042>
- Block, Fred and Frances Fox Piven (2010). *Politics & Society* 38.2, pp. 205–211.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329210365043>
- Brandolini, Andrea (2010). “Political Economy and the Mechanics of Politics”. *Politics & Society* 38.2, pp. 212–226.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329210365045>
- Campbell, Andrea Louise (2010). “The Public’s Role in Winner-Take-All Politics”. *Politics & Society* 38.2, pp. 227–232.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329210365046>
- Fligstein, Neil (2010). “Politics, the Reorganization of the Economy, and Income Inequality, 1980–2009”. *Politics & Society* 38.2, pp. 233–242.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329210365047>
- Jacobs, Lawrence R. (2010). “Democracy and Capitalism: Structure, Agency, and Organized Combat”. *Politics & Society* 38.2, pp. 243–254.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329210365048>
- Kenworthy, Lane (2010a). “Business Political Capacity and the Top-Heavy Rise in Income Inequality: How Large an Impact?” *Politics & Society* 38.2, pp. 255–265.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329210365049>
- Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson (2010a). “Winner-Take-All Politics and Political Science: A Response”. *Politics & Society* 38.2, pp. 266–282.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329210365050>

Further Readings

- Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson (2011). *Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer — And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class*. Simon & Schuster
- Volscho, Thomas W. and Nathan J. Kelly (2012). “The Rise of the Super-Rich: Power Resources, Taxes, Financial Markets, and the Dynamics of the Top 1 Percent, 1949 to 2008”. *American Sociological Review* 77.5, pp. 679–699.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003122412458508>
- Kus, Basak (2012). “Financialisation and Income Inequality in OECD Nations: 1995–2007”. *Economic and Social Review* 43.4, pp. 477–495.
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/nmzfbxv>
- Lin, Ken-Hou and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey (2013). “Financialization and U.S. Income Inequality, 1970–2008”. *American Journal of Sociology* 118.5, pp. 1284–1329