

# Public Policy (POLS6023)

## Module Convenor

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Term 2, 2015/16

Lectures/Seminars: Wednesdays, 9am-midday

Office hours: Mondays, 15:00pm–17:00pm

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## Module Description

This module aims to introduce students to the process of public decision-making in modern democracies, and explains how decision-makers formulate and implement public decisions that have consequences for the everyday lives of citizens. The module is broadly structured according to what can be conceptualized as stages of the policy process. We begin with a focus on the preferences of voters, and then move on to consider the actions of politicians, bureaucrats, and judges. From there, we consider how policy-making in one jurisdiction or at one point in time may have political and policy consequences beyond its initial intent. Finally, we return to the question of where the preferences of voters actually come from by considering the importance of the media in forming political and policy attitudes.

On successful completion of this module students should have an understanding of:

- the basic features of the public policy process in ‘developed democracies’;
- the interplay between the different actors in the policy process;
- how political factors relate to the policy process;
- how to critically read and evaluate social scientific arguments and evidence.

## Lectures and Seminars

Each week there will be an introductory lecture followed by a seminar. Both will last about one hour. The lectures will introduce students to many of the ideas and issues relating to the various topics. The seminars will provide a forum for more focussed discussion. In each seminar, you should expect to be ready to discuss all of the required readings. You are also very welcome to raise issues from the further readings.

## Assessment and Essay Deadline

The course is assessed on the basis of one essay and one exam, where each counts for 50% of the overall mark. The essay must be a **maximum of 2,000 words**, excluding the bibliography. Please include the word count at the top of the essay. The deadline the essay **Wednesday 25th March 2015, 2pm**.

To complete the essay assignment, you must choose one of the two essay 'questions' below:

1. "The preferences of the people cannot be seen to drive public policy because 'the people' are composed of distinct organised interest groups." Discuss this statement and be sure to explain whether and why you agree or disagree with it.
2. In what ways can and do enacted policies transform the political environment within which they operate?

You will find useful guidance for writing and presenting essays on the SPP student website. These guidelines are designed to help you, and you should read them carefully and do your best to follow them. Good essays give clear and focused answers to the question asked, they have clear structures, and they are adequately and appropriately referenced. They do not provide a vague and unstructured discussion of the topic. Plagiarism is taken extremely seriously and can disqualify you from the course (for details of what constitutes plagiarism see <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/current-students/guidelines/plagiarism>). If you are in doubt about any of this, ask the tutor.

**Please note that this module is involved in a pilot system of online grading through the turnitin.com service. You should refer to the module Moodle page and in-class direction for further information. Other Political Science modules that you may be taking will almost certainly operate under the previous ('offline') system.**

## Reading for the Module

The list that follows is organised by lecture topic. You are not expected to read everything on the list, but you should be reading each week and you should come prepared to discuss what you have read with others in the class. To prepare for the class you should at least read the items listed in the 'required' readings. For many of the weeks/topics, I have added an extra 'popular readings' section for shorter, less academic, illustrations of some of the core points that arise from the required readings. I very much recommend that you look at these before class, as well. Of course, for your essay and exam preparation, you should pursue the 'further readings' for the respective topics, as well.

There are many general textbook treatments that provide an introduction to the study of public policy. Three that you may find useful to browse are:

- Parsons, Wayne (1995). *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis*. Edward Elgar
- John, Peter (2012). *Analyzing Public Policy*. 2nd ed. Abingdon, UK: Routledge
- Sabatier, Paul A., ed. (2007). *Theories of the Policy Process*. 3rd ed. Westview Press.  
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/abvowfo>

I have assigned required readings from Parsons (1995) for various topics, so you may find that particularly useful to have a copy of. The text by the Department's own Peter John (2012) is, of course, highly recommended. Sabatier (2007) is an edited volume that has chapters providing overviews of various approaches to studying public policy from leading practitioners of those approaches.

- The reading list (below) includes full bibliographic references to each article, chapter, book, or other reading. As such, you should be able to use the library services to find them yourself.

- Most of the reading is available in the UCL library, although you may find only limited copies. The Senate House and LSE libraries may also be of use to you.
- Where available, I have also included the URL based on the DOI (standing for Digital Object Identifier) of the reading. This will link you to *one* place where the reading is published online.
- The DOI links will only provide you with access when you are connected to the UCL network. If you are off-campus, you should use the Library's off-campus facility by visiting <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/library/electronic-resources>.
- Note, however, that the DOI link may *not* be the place through which the UCL subscription provides access. (This is not in my control.) If this occurs, you will often find that <http://www.jstor.org/> will work for you, subject to you being on-campus or having explicitly signed-in to the Library's off-campus service.
- Again, where available, I have also tried to provide URLs for readings that are not constrained by off-campus and/or login restrictions. This is often via the web sites of the authors of the readings and will tend to be the easiest way of retrieving items.
- Some readings may be available as e-books via the UCL library. These are marked with the \* symbol in the reading list.
- Some readings may only be available in hard copy. In these cases, I will endeavour to make them available as scanned PDFs via the module's Moodle site found via <http://moodle.ucl.ac.uk/>. These are marked with the ➡ symbol in the reading list.
- Some of the readings listed below are a little more challenging. I have marked these with the \* symbol. They may be helpful to you for increasing your understanding of the intuition of arguments, but do not worry about difficulties that you may have understanding mathematical or statistical material in these papers.
- Some of the 'readings' may actually be podcasts or other types of audio or video. I have marked these with the “” symbol.

One potential downside to electronic journals is that they do not foster the browsing around issues and volumes that comes with the hard copies of journals. I very much encourage you to do this kind of browsing — via web sites or hard copies, as you prefer. This is likely to be particularly helpful when preparing for essays.

# 1 Public Policy and the Policy-Making Process

This first week provides an accessible overview of the topic of the module. The reading list is limited this week, but you may like to take the opportunity to dip into some of the textbooks listed in the ‘Reading for the Module’ section, above. I will give a lecture on the topic this week, but there will be no seminar that is directed towards this material.

## Readings

- ➔ Parsons, Wayne (1995). *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis*. Edward Elgar, pp. 1–82
- Sabatier, Paul A., ed. (2007). *Theories of the Policy Process*. 3rd ed. Westview Press.  
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/abvowfo>, Chapter 1
- \* John, Peter (2012). *Analyzing Public Policy*. 2nd ed. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, Chapters 1 and 2

## 2 Policy Preferences of the People

In a democracy, it seems reasonable to think that public policies will be made on the basis of the will of the people. Given that, a natural starting point for analysis of the policy process is whether and how this “will” can be seen to exist. Are citizens/voters ignorant or informed? Are they rational? Are they rationally ignorant? What are the policy preferences of the people?

### Popular Readings

- Kellner, Peter (2014). “Immigration is key to Britons’ growing hostility to Europe”. *The Guardian*. URL: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/03/immigration-key-britons-growing-hostility-europe> (Retrieved 12/18/2014)

### Required Readings

- ➡ Zaller, John R. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 3
- \* Page, Benjamin I. and Robert Y. Shapiro (2010). *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences*. University of Chicago Press, Pp. 15–17 and Chapter 2
- ➡ Caplan, Bryan (2011). *The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapter 1

### Further Readings

- Converse, Philip (1964). “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics”. In: *Ideology and Discontent*. Ed. by David Apter. New York, NY: Free Press.  
URL: [http://ftp.voteview.com/The\\_Nature\\_of\\_Belief\\_Systems\\_in\\_Mass\\_Publics\\_Converse\\_1964.pdf](http://ftp.voteview.com/The_Nature_of_Belief_Systems_in_Mass_Publics_Converse_1964.pdf)
- Delli Carpini, Michael and Scott Keeter (1996). *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
- Lupia, Arthur and Mathew D. McCubbins (1998). *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
- Bartels, Larry M. (2005). “Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind”. *Perspectives on Politics* 3(1), pp. 15–31.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592705050036>
- Lupia, Arthur, Adam Seth Levine, et al. (2007). “Were Bush Tax Cut Supporters ‘Simply Ignorant’? A Second Look at Conservatives and Liberals in ‘Homer Gets a Tax Cut’”. *Perspectives on Politics* 5(04), pp. 773–784.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707072210>
- Bartels, Larry M. (2007). “Homer Gets a Warm Hug: A Note on Ignorance and Extenuation”. *Perspectives on Politics* 5(4), pp. 785–790.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707072222>
- Zaller, John (2012). “What Nature and Origins Leaves Out”. *Critical Review* 24(4), pp. 569–642.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2012.807648> — and other articles from this special issue.

### 3 Policy Preferences of Organized Groups

If there are difficulties with relying on the preferences of ‘the people’, as a whole, to provide the starting point for policy-making, what about when they are organized into groups? Much or even most political activity occurs via such ‘collective actions’. What is it that leads people to choose to join or not join groups that have political goals? Do all people that support the goals of an organization join it? Is it irrational not to do so? Do groups of individuals necessarily make decisions that are in their collective best interests?

Our theoretical focus this week will be on Olson (1971). Many applications of this theory are possible — including a sweeping treatment of ‘The Rise and Decline of Nations’ by Olson (1982), himself. Our applied focus will be on the problems and possibilities of slowing climate change through cross-national collective action.

#### Popular Readings

- Green, Jessica F. (2015). *Wondering what’s different about the Paris climate change negotiations? Here’s what you need to know*. Monkey Cage Blog. Washington Post.  
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/zzv3da8> (Retrieved 12/10/2015)

#### Required Readings

- ➔ Olson, Mancur (1971). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Chapter 1  
N.B. Section E of this chapter provides a non-technical/non-mathematical summary of Section D, the latter of which you are free to skip.
- McLean, Iain (2000). “Review Article: The Divided Legacy of Mancur Olson”. *British Journal of Political Science* 30 (4), pp. 651–668.  
URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/194289> (Retrieved 09/03/2015)
- Harris, Paul G. (2007). “Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime Failure”. *Natural Resources Journal* 47(1), pp. 195–224.  
URL: [http://lawschool.unm.edu/nrj/volumes/47/1/06\\_harris\\_collective.pdf](http://lawschool.unm.edu/nrj/volumes/47/1/06_harris_collective.pdf)

#### Further Readings

- Olson, Mancur (1982). *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
- Hardin, Russell (1982). *Collective Action*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press
- Oliver, Pamela (1980). “Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations”. *American Journal of Sociology* 85(6), pp. 1356–1375.  
URL: <http://www.uvm.edu/~pdodds/files/papers/others/1980/oliver1980.pdf> (Retrieved 09/07/2015)
- Tarrow, Sidney G. (1994). *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
- Richardson, Jeremy (2000). “Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change”. *Political Studies* 48(5), pp. 1006–1025.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00292>
- Esty, Daniel C. and Anthony L. I. Moffa (2012). “Why Climate Change Collective Action has Failed and What Needs to be Done Within and Without the Trade Regime”. *Journal of International Economic Law* 15(3), pp. 777–791.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgs033>

## 4 Politicians as Representatives

‘The people’ elect politicians, at least partly on the expectation that they will make public policy on the basis of the preferences — where they exist — of those who voted for them. Do politicians act on the basis of these preferences? What interests do politicians follow? Why?

### Popular Readings

- Corn, David (2012). *SECRET VIDEO: Romney Tells Millionaire Donors What He REALLY Thinks of Obama Voters*.  
URL: <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/secret-video-romney-private-fundraiser> (Retrieved 12/18/2014)

### Required Readings

- Downs, Anthony (1957). “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy”. *Journal of Political Economy* 65(2), 135–150.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1827369>
- ➔ Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strøm, eds. (1999). *Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties Make Hard Choices*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1
- Page, Benjamin I. and Robert Y. Shapiro (1983). “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy”. *American Political Science Review* 77 (01), pp. 175–190.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1956018>  
OR  
Brooks, Clem and Jeff Manza (2006). “Social Policy Responsiveness in Developed Democracies”. *American Sociological Review* 71(3), pp. 474–494.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/30039000>
- Gilens, Martin and Benjamin I. Page (2014). “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”. *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (03), pp. 564–581.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001595>

### Further Readings

- \* Strøm, Kaare (1990). “A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties”. *American Journal of Political Science* 34(2), pp. 565–598.  
URL: <http://notecrom.com/content/files/718/file.pdf>
- \* Soroka, Stuart N. and Christopher Wlezien (2009). *Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion, and Policy*. Cambridge University Press.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CB09780511804908>, Especially chapter 7
- Hakhverdian, Armèn (2010). “Political Representation and its Mechanisms: A Dynamic Left-Right Approach for the United Kingdom, 1976–2006”. *British Journal of Political Science* 40(4), pp. 835–856.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000712341000013X>
- Warwick, Paul V. (2011). “Voters, Parties, and Declared Government Policy”. *Comparative Political Studies* 44(12), pp. 1675–1699.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414011407475>
- Carnes, Nicholas (2013). *White-Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making*. Chicago Studies in American Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press

## 5 Legislative Politics and Institutions

The previous week implicitly assumed a rather simple model of political decision making: essentially that the ‘winning’ politician or party was able to implement a policy of their own or their electorate’s choosing. But many policies are decided by votes in legislatures, rather than the decision of a single elected person. How do such collective decisions occur? Can we explain or even predict the outcomes of legislative policy-making?

### Popular Readings

- Waugh, Paul (2015). “Tax Credit Cuts U-Turn From George Osborne Just Weeks After Lords Forced Him To Retreat On £4.4bn Plan”. *The Huffington Post UK*.  
URL: [http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/11/25/story\\_n\\_8646322.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/11/25/story_n_8646322.html) (Retrieved 11/30/2015)

### Required Readings

- Riker, William H (1980). “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions”. *American Political Science Review* 74(2), 432–446.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1960638>
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast (1981). “Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice”. *Public Choice* 37(3), pp. 503–519.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00133748>
- Tsebelis, George (1999). “Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis”. *American Political Science Review* 93(3), pp. 591–608

### Further Readings

- Krehbiel, Keith (1988). “Spatial Models of Legislative Choice”. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13(3), pp. 259–319.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/439787>.  
URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/439787>
- Scharpf, Fritz W. (1988). “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration”. *Public Administration* 66(3), 239–278.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1988.tb00694.x>
- Immergut, Ellen M. (1992). *Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/ojrk8ca>
- Steinmo, Sven and Jon Watts (1995). “It’s the institutions, stupid! Why comprehensive national health insurance always fails in America”. *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 20(2), pp. 329–372.  
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/pkx7rer>
- Hacker, Jacob S. (1998). “The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy”. *Studies in American Political Development* 12(1), pp. 57–130.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X98001308>
- Tsebelis, George (2002). *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

## 6 Politicians as Decision-Makers

The previous two weeks largely treated politicians as (sometimes reliable) followers of the preferences of others — or at least as holding fairly clear policy preferences of their own or of their major constituencies. However, policy-making is complicated. What if voter preferences over policy choices are uncertain? What if voter preferences over policy outcomes are uncertain? What if the outcomes of policy choices are uncertain? How can we make sense of the decision-making process that politicians-as-policy-makers face?

### Required Readings

- Lindblom, Charles E. (1959). “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’”. *Public Administration Review*, pp. 79–88.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/973677>.  
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/nal371t>
- Simon, Herbert A. (1955). “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice”. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 69(1), pp. 99–118.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1884852>
- Allison, Graham T. (1969). “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”. *American Political Science Review* 63 (3), pp. 689–718.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1954423>

### Further Readings

- Parsons, Wayne (1995). *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis*. Edward Elgar, pp. 271–322
- March, James G. (1978). “Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice”. *Bell Journal of Economics* 9(2), pp. 587–608.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3003600>.  
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/pnbcpyh>
- Lindblom, Charles E. (1979). “Still Muddling, Not Yet Through”. *Public Administration Review*, pp. 517–527.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/976178>
- Wildavsky, Aaron (1973). “If planning is everything, maybe it’s nothing”. *Policy Sciences* 4(2), pp. 127–153.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01405729>
- ➡ Goodin, Robert E. (1981). *Political Theory & Public Policy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, Chapter 2
- Butler, David, Andrew Adonis, and Tony Travers (1994). *Failure in British Government: The Politics of the Poll Tax*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press
- Jones, Bryan D. (2003). “Bounded Rationality and Political Science: Lessons from Public Administration and Public Policy”. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 13(4), pp. 395–412.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jpart/mug028>.  
URL: <http://www.esf.edu/es/felleman/696am%20bounded%20rationality.Pdf>

## 7 Bureaucracy and Delegation

Policy has been chosen by the appropriate political leaders; now what? Policy must be implemented, and that implementation is usually pursued by a bureaucracy. Is implementation trivial? Can politicians successfully monitor what bureaucrats are doing? What if the bureaucracy has policy preferences of its own, and they are distinct from those of political leaders?

### Required Readings

- McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984). “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms”. *American Journal of Political Science* 28(1), pp. 165–179.  
URL: <http://polazzo.com/mccubbins.pdf>
- Dunleavy, Patrick (1985). “Bureaucrats, Budgets and the Growth of the State: Reconstructing an Instrumental Model”. *British Journal of Political Science* 15(3), pp. 299–328.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000712340000421X>
- \* Huber, John D. and Charles R. Shipan (2002). *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 4 and 7

### Further Readings

- \* Weingast, Barry R. and Mark J. Moran (1983). “Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission”. *Journal of Political Economy* 91(5), pp. 765–800.  
URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1837369>
- Moe, Terry M. (1984). “The New Economics of Organization”. *American Journal of Political Science* 28(4), pp. 739–777.  
URL: <http://tinyurl.com/n651pv3>
- McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast (1987). “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control”. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 3(2), 243–277
- Wilson, James Q. (1989). *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. New York, NY: Basic Books
- Huber, John D. (2000). “Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies”. *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3), pp. 397–413.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00519>
- Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler (2001). “Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy”. *American Journal of Political Science* 45(2), pp. 330–345.  
URL: <http://polisci.columbia.edu/files/polisci/u86/huber%20shipan%20pfahler.pdf> (Retrieved 12/08/2015)
- Franchino, Fabio (2004). “Delegating Powers in the European Community”. *British Journal of Political Science* 34(2), pp. 269–293.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123404000055>.  
URL: <http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/12038/1/12038.pdf> (Retrieved 12/11/2015)
- Hicks, Timothy (2014). “Partisan Governance and Policy Implementation: The Politics of Academy Conversion Amongst English Schools”. *Public Administration* 92(4), pp. 995–1016.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/padm.12100>

## 8 Policy Learning and Diffusion

Policy has been made and it has been implemented. Isn't there scope for policy-makers to learn from the outcomes? Can policies be reformed on the basis of evidence from earlier experiences? How does policy learning of this sort happen? Does it only occur within countries, or is there diffusion of policies between countries? How can we be sure that such policy diffusion is based on 'learning', rather than some other mechanism?

### Popular Readings

- Stewart, William (2013). "How Pisa came to rule the world". *TES Connect*.  
URL: <https://www.tes.co.uk/article.aspx?storyCode=6379193> (Retrieved 12/18/2014)
- Strauss, Valerie (2013). *Are Finland's vaunted schools slipping?* Washington Post.  
URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/12/03/are-finlands-vaunted-schools-slipping/> (Retrieved 01/12/2016)

### Required Readings

- Sabatier, Paul A. (1988). "An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein". *Policy Sciences* 21(2-3), pp. 129–168.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00136406>
- Simmons, Beth A., Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett (2006). "Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism". *International Organization* 60(4), pp. 781–810.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060267>
- Bieber, Tonia and Kerstin Martens (2011). "The OECD PISA Study as a Soft Power in Education? Lessons from Switzerland and the US". *European Journal of Education* 46(1), pp. 101–116.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-3435.2010.01462.x>

### Further Readings

- Sabatier, Paul A. (1998). "The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe". *Journal of European Public Policy* 5(1), pp. 98–130.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501768880000051>
- Dale, Roger (1999). "Specifying globalization effects on national policy: a focus on the mechanisms". *Journal of Education Policy* 14(1), pp. 1–17.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/026809399286468>
- Rinne, Risto, Johanna Kallo, and Sanno Hokka (2004). "Too Eager to Comply? OECD Education Policies and the Finnish Response". *European Educational Research Journal* 3(2), pp. 454–485.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/eerj.2004.3.2.3>
- Grek, Sotiria et al. (2009). "National policy brokering and the construction of the European Education Space in England, Sweden, Finland and Scotland". *Comparative Education* 45(1), pp. 5–21.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050060802661378>
- Grek, Sotiria (2009). "Governing by numbers: the PISA "effect" in Europe". *Journal of Education Policy* 24(1), pp. 23–37.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02680930802412669>

## 9 Policy Feedback to the People

Policy elites may learn from prior policy choices and implementations, but what about ‘the people’? If they do not observe how policy has changed, how can they be said to have meaningful policy preferences at all? Furthermore, are there feedback effects such that earlier policy choices actually shape the preferences of the people in later periods? What are the political implications of such processes?

### Required Readings

- Wlezien, Christopher (1995). “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending”. *American Journal of Political Science* 39(4), pp. 981–1000.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111666>
- Pierson, Paul (1993). “When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change”. *World Politics* 45(4), pp. 595–628.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2950710>
- Korpi, Walter (2001). “Contentious Institutions: An Augmented Rational-Action Analysis of the Origins and Path Dependency of Welfare State Institutions in Western Countries”. *Rationality and Society* 13(2), pp. 235–283.  
DOI-URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104346301013002005>

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## 10 Information, Agenda Setting, and the Media

The flow of the preceding topics — from voter preferences to policy choice to implementation — has provided something of an idealized perspective on the policy process. What determines which issues the people even have preferences on? Is the information that they have important in answering this? Who provides the information, and why? Does the media have extra-governmental power by virtue of an agenda-setting role?

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